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INTRODUCTION
The pragmatics of privatization are terrain for a critical
understanding of the relationship between government and business
under the conditions associated with the globalization of neoliberal
capitalism.1 Prison privatization is especially significant in this
context, given the fact that—for privatization advocates and critics
alike, in the United States and elsewhere—prisons represent a
bellwether for broader questions about the scope of government.2 As
John Donohue writes, “[f]ew roles in our American society seem more
inherently ‘public’ than those of the police, the judges and the jailers.”3
Given the traditional association of prisons with core governmental
functions,4 prison privatization is strategically key to privatization
1. Our usage of these terms is explained below. As Leibling and Sparks have
observed: “[T]he changing distribution of powers and responsibilities for the
allocation or delivery of punishment and quasi-penal control (most obviously
imprisonment and cognate forms of detention and segregation) between states and
other actors cannot but be a matter of fundamental interest.” Alison Liebling & Richard
Sparks, Editors’ Preface, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 283, 283 (2002).
2. For an extensive summary of policy and legal issues encountered in states’
prison privatization initiatives, see generally JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS & THE URBAN INST., ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND
JAILS (1987). For comprehensive histories of prison privatization and critical accounts
of current debates, see generally CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN
RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 2003); MICHAEL A. HALLETT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA:
A CRITICAL RACE PERSPECTIVE (2006); PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001); BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON
PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2008).
3. JOHN D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE INTERESTS 3 (Econ.
Policy Inst. ed. 1988).
4. This Article concerns the U.S. experience, but the British debates are to some
extent parallel. Regarding prison privatization, Sir Leon Radzinowicz has stated:
[I]n a democracy grounded on the rule of law and public accountability the
enforcement of penal legislation . . . should be the undiluted responsibility of
the state. It is one thing for private companies to provide services for the
prison system but it is an altogether different matter for bodies whose
motivation is primarily commercial to have coercive powers over prisoners.
Elaine Genders, Legitimacy, Accountability and Private Prisons, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y
285, 289 (2002) (citation omitted). Genders’s article concerns the private prison
debate in the United Kingdom—a strong parallel involves incarceration as a
constitutional preserve. See generally id. Genders is critical of the idea of core
governmental functions as an inherent obstacle to privatization, in that privatization—
as delegation by the executive—does not automatically remove imprisonment from
the aegis of the state. See id. at 286. The Supreme Courts of Israel and India have
recently ruled private prisons unconstitutional. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s),
Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and Statization: Icons and Experiences of
Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 162, 162 (2013). On Israeli debates
over core governmental functions as limits to privatization, see generally Richard
Harding, State Monopoly of ‘Permitted Violation of Human Rights’: The Decision of the
Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and Management of Prisons,

2014]

INMATE LABOR

357

proponents, as a test of the very notion of core government.5 Core
government—implying a non-delegable “duty to govern”—is itself an
issue in debate.6 The centrality of prison privatization to wider
debates about privatization gives us our starting point in this Article.
We agree with Frank Michelman’s assessment that privatization raises
constitutional questions in a way that globalization does not, at least
not automatically.7 Taken to an extreme, or in its most ideological
form, one might imagine—with Michelman—that privatization makes
government an “empty shell.”8 However, as Elaine Genders and others
have noted, in the prison context, privatization does not automatically
challenge the idea of core governmental functions since it does not
automatically remove the state altogether from the process.9 Setting
up contractual terms, standards, monitoring procedures,
accountability, and conditions for rescission may all remain with the
state.10 What, then, is the problem with prison privatization? In what
follows, rather than discuss this question in traditional binary terms—
public versus private, or more efficient versus less efficient—we read
the private prison debate as a test of the government’s ability to
mediate the public’s responsibility for the human conditions of
citizenship. This enables us to take a broader perspective on what is at
stake in these debates, especially for the prisoners involved, when the
state decides to privatize.

14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012). On the constitutionality of privatization in the
United States, see Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1437–39 (2003).
5. Charles H. Logan formulates the position in this way:
The privatization of corrections, or punishment, is an especially significant
part of the broader privatization movement.
By challenging the
government’s monopoly over one of its ‘core’ functions, the idea directly
threatens the assumption that certain activities are essentially and
necessarily governmental . . . . Thus, privatization in the area of criminal
justice generally, and of imprisonment particularly, plays an important part
in a broad, ideological debate over the proper scope and size of government.
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS & PROS 4 (1990).
6. “Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated the question of
whether privatization undermines core public law values in the United States.” Laura
A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND DEMOCRACY 335, 335 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). On the “duty to
govern,” see generally Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 310.
7. See Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063,
1073 (2000).
8. See id. at 1065.
9. Genders, supra note 4, at 289–90.
10. See id. at 300; see also Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality,
and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L REV. 1868, 1870 (2002).
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Our findings, thus, challenge assumptions that would situate prison
privatization as a test of government’s scope. For one thing,
privatization itself is a form of governmental action, and may involve
various forms of control on the part of the contracting agencies.11 More
fundamentally for our purposes, the history we relate shows that
privatization is not a unified phenomenon; prison privatization has a
long and particular history that compels attention to diverse rationales
and approaches.12 Moreover, that same history shows that prison
privatization became a test of government’s scope only after a priority
on limiting government was politicized and set in place as a matter of
policy under the Reagan and Bush Administrations (and continued
thereafter). In relation to prisons, then, privatization should not be
seen as a necessary response to a contemporary state of affairs, but a
favored response, for reasons that predate the inmate explosion.13
Accordingly, we suggest that the key factors usually credited with
causing the demand for private prisons arguably include the effects of a
neoliberalization of public administration already well under way by
the early 1980s. These are among the issues pursued in the following
sections.
The “privatization of prisons” is a phrase that refers to many
spheres of activity that are contractually separate and, in some ways
(as we shall see), conceptually distinct—as some involve direct
substitution of private-for-public providers, whereas others involve

11. “When private regulation is harnessed by public regulation, structures of
private governance are embedded and integrated into a broader framework of public
oversight.” Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVT’L & ADMIN.
L. 291, 317 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. On the diversity of privatization in relation to public law, see generally Laura A.
Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006). On
public law values in privatization, see also Michelman, supra note 7, at 1073; see
generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285 (2003). For analysis of democratic challenges, and human rights challenges,
in prison privatization, see generally Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and Democracy:
Resources in Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 261 [hereinafter Aman, Privatization and Democracy];
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to
Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2005)
[hereinafter Aman, Democracy Deficits in the U.S.]; Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and
the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through
Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001). On democracy deficit in
globalization, see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) [hereinafter AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT].
13. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION
BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2014), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.
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reconfigurations of purposes and policies. As areas of activity and
related potential for reform—prison labor, prison services, prison
construction, and management—may all involve quite distinct forms of
enterprise. In this Article, we emphasize the human side of prison
privatization—that is, those aspects of private sector involvement that
affect inmates directly, such as their health care, nutrition, living
conditions, and, especially for purposes of this Article, their labor.
Looking ahead to our conclusions, one implication of our analysis is
that direct human services—such as those that affect the dignity of the
person, the integrity of the body, and the value of personal labor—
should be treated differently by the law governing privatization. In
these areas, in which people may be irreparably harmed, additional
safeguards are warranted, along with more public involvement, and
more provision for public involvement at the initial contract
negotiation stages as well as rescission. Direct human vulnerability
mandates more direct forms of public participation than those more
impersonal domains of government contracts dealing with, for
example, the construction of roads or bridges, and routine service
contracts in which expenses and revenues may be more definitive. It is
in this respect—namely, the human dimensions of prison contracts—
that prison privatization may be more appropriately considered a
bellwether for the provision of basic services, not just to inmates in
public prisons, but also to other populations made vulnerable by
confinement or other constraints, including labor precarity (structural
underemployment), persistent poverty, chronic illness, or immigrant
status.
Our aim, therefore, is to reexamine some of the key terms of
discussion surrounding prison privatization. We propose a resetting of
those terms in three respects. First, we argue that the context of
prison privatization should include the privatization movement and its
relevance to the globalization of capital in the 1970s (and continuing
today). Second, resetting the context in this way lengthens the modern
history of prison privatization from its conventional starting point in
the prison-overcrowding crisis of the late 1980s and 1990s,14 to show
its emergence at least a decade earlier, as part of the broader
movement to privatization in state and federal government. Seen from
that longer perspective, prison privatization is integral to privatization

14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: COST SAVINGS
BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED 8–12 (1991), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD90-1BR, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION’S PRISON SYSTEMS 4–5 (1989),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/77582.pdf.
AND
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in other sectors, and, in turn, to the neoliberalization of government
and global markets. The longer view also leaves room for an account
of prison privatization that considers aspects of privatization affecting
the prison sector in addition to prison privatization per se. In this
Article, we discuss prison labor as a key element of that larger picture.
Thus, third, we turn to prison labor. We discuss two federal
initiatives that involved the private sector in corrections well prior to
prison privatization. Both of these involved prison labor, though under
substantially different models, and with different aims. These
initiatives—their similarities as well as their differences—shed light
on the privatization of prison labor as a crucial through-line of reform
from the 1970s, and even earlier, through the present day. The more
complete chronology that we advocate is rooted to debates—within
government and between business and labor—about prison labor as a
sector of the national and global work force. Issues related to inmate
labor are relevant to the analysis of prison privatization as well as to
the potential for improving this aspect of our justice system through
law. In particular, they make visible the wider situation of those who
labor in the current “post-Fordist” era outside of the prison walls.15
We argue for acknowledging inmate labor as labor, as a fresh starting
point for debates currently defined by the polarity of punishment and
rehabilitation. Revising the terms of discussion in these three ways
(resetting context, lengthening the chronology, and focusing on the
privatization of labor) improves one’s understanding of the
development of prison privatization in relation to other aspects of the

15. “Post-Fordism” refers to a periodization of capitalism that, since the 1970s, has
put a premium on flexibility—i.e., maximizing the mobility of capital for purposes of
strategic investment and offloading of risk—as a key to successful competition in the
global economy. In contrast to Fordism (the mass production of the assembly line),
post-Fordist enterprises retain their capacity for “flexible [capital] accumulation” by
developing “flexible labor markets and geographies of production”—i.e., moving
production to locations where labor and supplies can be found at minimal cost, and
setting labor conditions such that workers themselves absorb the risks of fluctuating
demand (by cyclical unemployment or suppressed wages). While the specifics of such
periodization (including its causes and effects) are issues of debate, we use the term as
a general reference to the historical conditions that made “heightened competition,
entrepreneurialism and neo-conservatism” central to the social organization of the
economy in the United States. On post-Fordism as flexible accumulation, labor
markets and geographies, see ASH AMIN, Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms
of Transition, in POST-FORDISM: A READER 1, 6 (Ash Amin ed., 1994). On post-Fordism as
heightened competition, entrepreneurialism, and neo-conservativism, see DAVID
HARVEY, THE URBAN EXPERIENCE 13 (1989). On “post-Fordist corrections,” see DARIO
MELOSSI, CONTROLLING CRIME, CONTROLLING SOCIETY: THINKING ABOUT CRIME IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA 237–41 (2008).
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relationship between government and business under conditions of
globalization.
Our analysis proceeds in three main steps, each one providing the
theme of one of the Article’s three main Parts. Part I provides
background by filling in the relevant connections between the
globalization of capital and privatization in the United States—
resetting the privatized prison context and lengthening its timeline, as
mentioned above.16 We emphasize the modern origins of prison
privatization—that is, prison privatization since the 1970s—in the
larger privatization movement. In the first sections of Part I, we argue
that the context of modern prison privatization is appropriately placed
in the economic restructuring associated with the globalization of
neoliberal capitalism. The reforms associated with privatization are
not just illustrative of a swing of the regulatory pendulum from liberal
to conservative; rather, they represent a fundamental shift in the
governing role now played by the state in this age of globalization.17
Appreciating the connections between globalization and privatization
is thus key to the rest of the discussion, as prison privatization
emerges as a domestic “face” of globalization.18
In the second part of Part I, we pursue those connections more
specifically in relation to prison privatization. Most discussions of
prison privatization in the United States—among politicians,
academics, and advocates alike—take as a given the development of

16. For additional background to legislative, executive, and judicial responses to
globalization at the federal level, see ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL
ERA 125–30 (1992) [hereinafter AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA]; ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 124–27; Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the
Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1193–1201 (1988) [hereinafter
Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency];
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1697–1700 (2002); see also CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE
PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (2011).
Aman has dubbed these trends as indicative of “the global age” of regulatory reform,
carried out by a “globalizing state.”
Greenhouse has tracked the political
mainstreaming of an approach to social policy that favored marketization as a
regulatory mechanism in the 1980s and 1990s. See generally GREENHOUSE, supra.
17. For discussion of the “globalizing state” and the “global era” of administrative
law, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16; Aman, Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra note 16.
18. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization from the Ground up: a Domestic Perspective,
in THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND GOVERNANCE 5–17
(Beverley Crawford et al. eds., 2008); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Private Prisons and the
Democratic Deficit, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES
AND ITS LIMITS 87 (Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher eds., 2009); see also, AMAN, THE
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 7, 101–105.
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prison privatization as a cost-efficient solution to the interrelated
problems of prison population explosion and taxpayer resistance to
expanding government budgets.19 These are important factors, but we
suggest that additional sources of the various forms of prison
privatization lie elsewhere. We emphasize the early years of the
prison privatization movement, as various paths for reforming an
outmoded system eventually drew the attention of every branch of the
federal government, many states, various business sectors, and other
organizations in the United States. These early efforts focused on
prison labor as a primary site of private sector involvement.20
In Part II, we turn to two major prison privatization initiatives, both
of which involved key actors within the federal government, and both
of which predate the prison-crowding crisis of the late 1980s. We
compare these initiatives as distinct models of privatization, noting the
federal uptake of the privatization movement’s emphasis on reforming
the financialization of government, as this was applied to the prison
sector.21 Taking these early initiatives into account, we argue that the

19. See infra Part II. For examples especially relevant to policy issues affecting
prison privatization, see generally GAIL S. FUNKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR INNOVATIONS IN
CORRECTIONS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRISON INDUSTRIES: DISCUSSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(Gaile
S.
Funke
ed.,
1986),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/102295NCJRS.pdf; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N
ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABB472.pdf; Prison Privatization, CORRECTIONS
PROJECT, http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited
June 27, 2014). For a different starting point, cast in terms of the rise of managerialism
and a concomitant policy shift toward punishment, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL 105–06 (2001).
20. By prison labor, we refer to the paid work of inmates. Prison staff salaries are
relevant to a larger discussion of prison finances and potential cost efficiencies;
however, that is not our purpose in this Article. On prison staff salaries as a factor in
assessments of prison privatization, see JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS iii (2001), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf. In 1995, as privatization advocates
in Congress and elsewhere pressed to increase privatization, the growth of staff
salaries and expanding expenditure for salaries represented the largest source of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ growth in expenditures. Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns
and Challenges for the Future: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director,
Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106064.pdf [hereinafter Bureau of Prisons: Recent
Concerns].
21. By “financialization,” we refer to an administrative priority on converting
capital into marketable financial assets so as to maximize opportunities for profit
and/or minimize fixed costs. In the prison sector, for example, privatization advocates
argued for broadening the role of the private sector in prison construction and
management both to support efficiency and as a means of freeing up government
assets for other uses with more growth potential. See SENTENCING PROJECT, PRISON
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more convincing chronology for prison privatization would start the
story in the modern efforts to privatize prison labor—specifically in
relation to Federal Prison Industries in the 1970s and 1980s, and
Congress’s creation of the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP) in 1979.22
We review these developments,
emphasizing their similarities and differences as privatization
initiatives, and linking on-going debates about prison labor
(particularly regarding minimum wage and the role of organized
labor) to the global economic situation. The focus on labor yields a
more appropriate context for approaching prison privatization as part
of the economic restructuring and deregulatory trends associated with
globalization.23
In Part III, we consider the implications of rethinking prison
privatization in relation to the privatization trends of the 1970s and
1980s. Most importantly, attention to prison labor underscores the
relevance of social conditions beyond prisons to the social conditions
of the prison itself—in particular, as breadwinners, family members,
community members, and, more generally, the “civil rights landscape”
of citizenship.24 Thus, the revision of chronology established in Parts I
PRIVATIZATION
AND
THE
USE
OF
INCARCERATION
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf
(discussing and critiquing the efficiency argument raised by advocates of
privatization).
22. PIECP was established under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1167, 1215. Federal Prison Industries (FPI) was
established in 1934 by Pub. L. No. 73-461, 48 Stat. 1211 and Exec. Order No. 6917, and
was reauthorized in 1948 by the 1948 Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 851 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 4122). Since 1977, FPI has been known by the trade-name
“UNICOR.” See UNICOR, FACTORIES WITH FENCES: 75 YEARS OF CHANGING LIVES 24 (2009),
available
at
https://www.unicor.gov/information/publications/pdfs/corporate/CATMC1101_C.pd
f.
23. On prison privatization as integral to economic restructuring in globalization,
see Rebecca M. McLennan, The New Penal State: Globalization, History, and American
Criminal Justice, 2 INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 407, 408 (2001) [hereinafter McLennan,
The New Penal State]. In this Article, we do not address the long history of prison labor
in the United States prior to the privatization movements of the 1970s and 1980s,
although it remains relevant to debates, then and now, as the object of reform. For
detailed accounts, see REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST,
POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 87–192 (2008)
[hereinafter MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT], on the history of partnerships
between business and prison agencies, and various prison labor regimes, particularly
those involving contracts and leased labor.
24. On citizenship as the “more encompassing” rubric for discussion of prison
reform (relative to rights claims), see Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Rights Without
Citizenship: Activist Politics And Prison Reform In The United States, in ROUTING THE
OPPOSITION—SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY 236–37 (David S. Meyer et
al. eds., 2005) (arguing for restoring the franchise to inmates); see also Mary Fainsod
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and II gives more prominence to prison labor as integral to wider
trends affecting domestic labor markets under pressure from global
competition. Acknowledging the wider context of prison privatization
clarifies the scope and substance of regulation, and the potential for
improvements through law and law reform, including but not limited
to issues of contracting. In Part III, we conclude our analysis in these
terms and apply our findings regarding prison privatization to
potential areas of improvement through law. Our aim is to contribute
to the private prison debate by shifting the terms of debate from the
financialization of government to the status of labor. Doing so widens
the scope for thinking of prisoners not as revenue streams, but as
beneficiaries of the corrections system and as members of
communities beyond prison walls, even while incarcerated.25 In this
regard, Mary Katzenstein suggests that “prisons as institutions can
serve as a mirror refracting the values and politics of a nation.”26 To
Katzenstein’s observation, we would only add the global context that
affects the status of labor, even within the walls of U.S. prisons.
I. PRISON PRIVATIZATION AS A DOMESTIC FACE OF GLOBALIZATION
Prison privatization refers to a broad array of privatized
construction, management, services, and inmate programming. Each
of these areas is a piece of a much larger picture of the privatization of
government functions in the United States.
As such, prison
privatization is part of a broader regulatory phenomenon
characteristic of globalization. In this Part, we discuss privatization as
a feature of globalization, before returning to issues raised by prison
privatization.
For purposes of this Article, we take globalization—a term in wide
and diffuse usage—to refer to myriad measures aimed at accelerating
the flow of capital and maximizing competitive opportunities for
accumulation.27 In this Article, we refer to neoliberal globalization, and

Katzenstein et al., The Dark Side of American Liberalism, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 1035, 1039–45
(2010).
25. On prison reforms and programs that cross prison walls in this way, see
Michelle Brown, Of Prisons, Gardens, and the Way Out, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 67, 82–83 (2014); Rebecca Ginsburg, Knowing That We Are Making a Difference:
A Case For Critical Prison Programming, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 33
(2014); Doran Larson, Introduction, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2014); see
also UNICOR, supra note 22, at 9.
26. Katzenstein et al., supra note 24, at 1036.
27. For general background on neoliberalization as a “distinctive form of
globalization” (in Harvey’s phrase), see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
152–72 (2005). Harvey defines “neoliberalism” as:
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sometimes to neoliberalization—signaling a now-pervasive capitalist
culture predicated on disembedding the market from government,
including maximum marketization of government services.28
A.

The Global Context: Privatization and Neoliberalization

In the United States, privatization should be understood as both a
driving and principal effect of globalization.29 The increasing reliance
on marketized forms of administration and corporate self-regulation in
lieu of regulation by government is commonly referred to as “the new

[A] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the [neoliberal]
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such
practices.
Id. at 2. In this Article, our concern with neoliberal globalization is primarily with
governmental and non-governmental interventions aimed at maximizing access to
capital markets and trade—acknowledging the asymmetries of power and influence
that enter into the establishment of global trade conditions and its selective benefits.
For a classic analysis of globalization in these terms, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and
Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (20062007).
28. “There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in
political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s.” HARVEY, supra note 27, at 2.
With respect to private prisons, Martha Minow writes: “[F]or-profit prisons . . . are
simply part of a larger pattern . . . . A sea change is at work . . . . Private and marketstyle mechanisms are increasingly employed to provide what government had taken as
duties.” MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 2–3
(2002). But the pervasiveness of neoliberalism does not imply a homogeneity of
experience within neoliberalism. For a critique of “convergence narratives” of
globalization from African perspectives, see JAMES FERGUSON, GLOBAL SHADOWS: AFRICA IN
THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER 28–29 (2006). For Asian perspectives, see generally
AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY (2006).
For a discussion of alternatives to neoliberal globalization from diverse critical
standpoints situated in the global south, see generally LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A.
Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). The importance of specificity is not limited to national
or regional experience; it is also relevant in the analysis of domestic policy fields. For a
discussion of neoliberalism and welfare administration reform, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Globalization and the Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 377, 377–78 (2013) (discussing Karl Polanyi and various ways in
which markets can be re-embedded into society).
29. “Governing by contract in the United States today should be understood as
integral to the processes, both political and economic, that made privatization a major
domestic response to as well as driver of globalization.” Aman, Privatization and
Democracy, supra note 12, at 261.
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governance.”30
The new governance is indicative of recent
transformations in the relationship between the market and the state
itself—transformations that are inseparable from global economic
competition and other forms of interdependence between state and
non-state actors, domestically and transnationally, as these have
developed in recent decades.31
Neoliberalization of government in the United States puts a political
premium on the financialization of public administration, government
services, and other government functions, in turn lending rhetorical
heft to two principal distinctions: between the public and private
sectors, and, correspondingly, between law and markets as regulatory
tools.32 The realities of financing government are far more complex

30. See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE
vii (2002). “The new governance” is Salamon’s term for an approach to problem
solving in the public sphere. It refers to an analytical
[F]ramework [emphasizing] the collaborative nature of modern efforts to
meet human needs, the widespread use of tools of action that engage complex
networks of public and private actors, and the resulting need for a different
style of public management, and a different type of public sector,
emphasizing collaboration and enablement rather than hierarchy and
control.
Id.
31. On transformations of the public sphere, see Ali Farazmand, Globalization,
Privatization and the Future of Modern Governance: A Critical Assessment, 2 PUB. FIN.
MGMT. 151, 152 (2002) (“With sweeping privatization of public enterprises and other
major governmental functions, the capacity and ability of governments in public
management are seriously diminished even as challenges and crises multiply in both
number and intensity. Globalization has not ended the state and public administration,
but it has caused a major qualitative change and alteration in the nature, character, and
role of the state and public management; in fact, state continuity persists because it is
instrumental to the functioning of capitalism.”). On transformations in private life, see
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, Introduction, in ETHNOGRAPHIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 3 (2010) (“In its
valorization of the individual, its preference for markets over rights as the basis for
social reform, and its withdrawal of the state from the service sector, neoliberalism
overwrites older notions of the public based in organic solidarity with a strong
mechanical overlay – as an improvement, or modernization, of more traditional social
bonds. Understanding this inversion is crucial to understanding the nature of the
interpretive questions to which neoliberalism gives rise in everyday life, since
neoliberal reform reshapes the relationship between society and the state without
eliminating what came before.”). For the impact of neoliberalization on the crime
policy and practice in recent decades, see GARLAND, supra note 19, at 105–06.
32. On the connections between the politics and rhetoric in the neoliberalization of
the federal government in the United States, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 76, 231.
On the dilemmas of the public/private distinction as related to globalization, see
SALAMON, supra note 30, at vii. On the distinction between state law and markets as
sources of regulation, see COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEO-LIBERALISM 24–
48 (2011); Farazmand, supra note 31, at 152. Michelman notes the binary ideological
distinction between these terms among some proponents and critics of privatization,
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than these rhetorical distinctions imply. Whereas the rhetoric implies
complementarity (more private sector equals less government, for
example), the diverse complexity of the state’s roles in privatization, as
well as the variety of businesses and business models involved, defy
neat boundaries.33 To the extent that maximizing the financialization
of government through privatization entails deregulation or
outsourcing, one should keep in mind the fact that these tools for
minimizing government (as the rhetoric implicitly claims) actually
extend government into new areas of the private sector, through
contracts, monitoring, and other means.34 A relevant example is prison
privatization, which at its inception had already involved a complex
cooperative arrangement between government and business,
developed over the course of years.35
Privatization by contract became politically popular in the United
States as an approach to the governmental provision of social services,
especially for the poor, for immigrants, and for prisoners—i.e.,
dependent populations whose situations expose them extensively to
managed care of various kinds.36 Such marketization became a sort of
political common sense as electorates, led by politicians and advocacy
groups, became aware of global economic competition in the 1980s
and 1990s.37 Municipal, state, and federal contracts with private
providers are not new in the United States, but—as in the prison

in contrast to the pragmatic impossibility of neatly separating them as actions or
effects. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1080.
33. See Farazmand, supra note 31, at 153; Genders, supra note 4, at 286–87. See
generally GARLAND, supra note 19.
34. On the expansion of the state’s role in relation to the privatization of prisons
and prison alternatives in the United States, see Malcolm Feeley, Entrepreneurs of
Punishment: The Legacy of Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321, 322–23 (2002). For
a discussion of how deregulation results in a new form of regulation, see AMAN, THE
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 48–53.
35. On the development of cooperation between government and business in the
prison sector, see DONNA SELMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, PUNISHMENT FOR SALE: PRIVATE PRISONS,
BIG BUSINESS, AND THE INCARCERATION BINGE 77–104 (2010). See also KATHERINE BECKETT,
MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS, 100–01 (1997);
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL
ORDER 233–39 (2011). See generally DONAHUE, supra note 3; Mona Lynch, Selling
‘Securityware’: Transformations in Prison Commodities Advertising, 1949–1999, 4
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, 305 (2002).
36. Martin Sellers refers to the public “production” of prisons—distinguishing
between production (which may be public or private, or both) and provision (which is
governmental). MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16–17, 33–36 (1993).
37. On the relevance of global economic competition to Congressional debates over
immigration, welfare, and civil rights, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 74.
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context—such contracts were now put to new ends, with the
government as both contractor and client.
Federal and state commitments to privatization are integral to the
neoliberalization of global capital, even when the relevant activities are
located entirely within the domestic territory of the United States.38
Understanding domestic privatization in global terms clarifies the
scope for law in relation to privatization—though we do not suggest
that law alone (for example, in the form of legislation or contracts) will
offer solutions to all the problems that currently encumber the systems
of corrections in the United States.39 It also introduces fresh
perspectives on the situation of imprisoned people beyond their status
as inmates (e.g., as wage earners, family members, citizens, and so
forth). Moreover, it highlights a potentially significant role for political
engagement involving diverse stakeholder communities—including
inmates’ families and communities.40
The advantage of understanding globalization’s “domestic face”—
i.e., its embeddedness in the local—is the light shed on the major roles
local actors and institutions can potentially play when it comes to

38. See GARLAND, supra note 19, at 127, 131–32 (discussing privatization and
globalization as the context for transformations in the penal field in Great Britain and
the United States).
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. To the extent that the public has been involved in such decisions, the question
has been framed around taxation and public expense. Commentators note that state
and local prison construction has been constrained by voters’ rejections of general
bond issues. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Michael Hallett notes that this is
not the only means available to governors and local executives for raising revenues for
new projects such as prison construction; lease-payment bonds are an alternative
means, not subject to a referendum. See Michael Hallett, Race, Crime, and for Profit
Imprisonment: Social Disorganization as Market Opportunity, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, 369,
375–76 (2002) (noting lease-payment bonds are an alternative to public bonds, not
subject to a referendum, available to governors and local executives for raising
revenues for new projects such as prison construction). To our knowledge, the public
has not been effectively involved in questions on the other side of the coin, in
particular, questions arising from the fact of profit-making corporations performing
the day-to-day functions of government. In the conclusions, we argue for broader
public engagement on such questions, which vary with the different settings in which
they arise. For example, privatizing a prison is very different than entering into a
contract for the construction and maintenance of buildings, bridges or roads. Thus,
distinguishing between what is public, and what is private, is highly contingent on the
extent to which the interests of government, the private sector, and specific political
communities (voters and others) align. We leave this point, for now, as a
terminological note: throughout, we refer to government and firms—rather than
public and private producers—to avoid prejudging the extent to which public and
private values and interests are commensurable in any given situation.

2014]

INMATE LABOR

369

creating a more humane conception of globalization and its practices.41
This in turn draws attention to the role of contracts in the privatization
process, and their potential for introducing more specificity,
transparency, and accountability into what is otherwise treated as
atypical government contracts dealing, for example, with bridge or
road construction.42 The human emergency that by definition
accompanies imprisonment makes these issues vivid and urgent.
The idea that globalization and domestic law are interrelated in the
private prison context may seem counter-intuitive, given that criminal
law enforcement is traditionally considered a domestic function. The
recent history of prison privatization, however, is fascinating precisely
because it reveals how fundamental questions, such as the significance
of territoriality, the scope of government, and other such basic matters
actually are undecided at any given point in time.
Appreciating privatization as integral to globalization fosters a
multi-centered approach to reform, open to multiple institutions and
communities. As we review policy paths taken and not taken in the
discussion below, our concern is not to endorse or condemn any
particular approach, but to highlight the contemporary complexity of
the question of how government defines its beneficiaries. Looking
ahead in that spirit, one role for law might be in the development of
infrastructures for reforms—e.g., contributing to the development of
new forums for deliberation and stakeholder participation in relation
to decisions not only regarding whether to outsource, but also how and
with whom. Another role might be in forging channels across policy
domains, as a corrective to the politicization of rhetoric, and the gap
between rhetoric and pragmatic effects, both of which occur more
easily when contentious issues are left in isolation. In this regard,

41. See Aman, Democracy Deficits in the U.S., supra note 12, at 7; see also SASKIA
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1 (2006)
(“The epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the national to
a far larger extent than is usually recognized. It is here that the most complex
meanings of the global are being constituted . . . .”).
42. For a detailed and critical analysis of the contracting process in the context of
prison health care, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on
Government Social Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York City,
14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 304 (2007) (“The least-bid government contract has
its variants, such as those that provide governments some discretion when social
services are involved. Such approaches, however, remain focused primarily on cost
and an open bidding procedure. They may be appropriate for infrastructrue projects
such as roads, bridges, or public buildings, or services such as building cleaning, copy
machine repair, or even food services. But they take on a negatively transformative
effect when applied to more fundamental human needs such as health.”).
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labor may be seen as a major connection between the prison world and
the world outside of prisons.
B.

Privatization, Outsourcing, Deregulation, and Globalization: A
Historical Perspective

In the United States, privatization usually means some form of
outsourcing, that is, the contracting out of some or all of an
administrative agency’s regulatory responsibilities to a private firm.43
The primary governance tool in privatization is the contract.44 The
management of prisons has been increasingly outsourced to the
private sector at both the federal and state levels since its inception in
the late 1980s and 1990s.45
Privatization of government by contracting out, or outsourcing, has
been a trend since the 1980s and through the 1990s—actively
promoted by the Reason Foundation,46 and the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, embraced by the Clinton Administration, and
accelerated by President George W. Bush’s directive, the President’s
Management Agenda 2003, mandating all federal agencies to privatize

43. U.S. privatization has occurred primarily in the form of outsourcing;
elsewhere—in the United Kingdom and other countries where utilities and other
services such as transportation are state-owned—privatization has involved the sale of
government assets. Mathew Blum proposes a distinction between privatization (as
sale), out-sourcing (as contract), and competitive sourcing (as a tool that is neutral as
between privatization and out-sourcing). See Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework
for Competing Commercial Work between Public and Private Sectors, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 64. In the context of this Article,
privatization of prisons largely takes the form of outsourcing, often with a competitive
sourcing rationale.
44. Federal contracts with private firms are covered by the Service Contract Act of
1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–58 (2006), and the Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423
(2006). Specific authority to contract for private prisons has been the subject of
debate over the years. In its 1988 report, the President’s Commission on Privatization
found authority for prison privatization in the Attorney General’s discretion regarding
the means of detaining prisoners. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 19, at
147; see 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1988); Pub. L. No. 89-176, 79 Stat. 674 (1965) (amending
§ 4082). However, in 1991, and reiterated in 1995, the U.S. General Accounting Office
felt this authority was insufficient, and recommended that Congress give the Bureau of
Prisons explicit authority to “conduct and evaluate a pilot test of federal prison
privatization.” Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1.
45. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 3.
46. See REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT: TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT
THROUGH
PRIVATIZATION
1–2
(2006),
available
at
http://reason.org/files/d767317fa4806296191436e95f68082a.pdf.
SourceWatch
attributes the Reason Foundation’s position on privatization to the influence of George
C. Zoley, CEO of GEO Group. See George C. Zoley, SOURCEWATCH,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/George_C._Zoley.
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administrative services to the maximum extent possible.47 State
legislatures have similarly mandated administrative reviews of
operations and, in some cases, assets, to assess the potential for
conversions to private ownership or management.48 The Obama
Administration has sought to reverse the trend towards offshore
outsourcing by various means, including significant tax relief for firms
that relocate to the territorial United States;49 however, privatization
through outsourcing remains a feature of government operations.
Privatization is one of the primary mechanisms governments have for
aligning the financialization of government with neoliberalization of
the global economy.50 In this section, we explain in broad terms how
that alignment works.

47. See FED. ACQUISITION COUNCIL, MANAGER’S GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE SOURCING 16–22 (2d
ed.
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_guides/fac
_manager_guide.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE
SOURCING: REPORT ON THE USE OF BEST VALUE TRADEOFFS IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION 2–5
(2006),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/procurement/comp_src/cs_best_value_report_2006.pdf
;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING:
CONDUCTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION IN A REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 1 (2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/comp_sourcing_0
72403.pdf; REASON FOUND., supra note 46, at 7, 23; REASON PUB. POLICY INST.,
PRIVATIZATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON CONTRACTING, PRIVATIZATION, AND GOVERNMENT
REFORM 1–4 (1997).
48. See REASON FOUND., supra note 46, at 55–60; Robert D. Boerner, Privatization of
State Government Services, NAT’L CONG. ST. LEGISLATURES LEGISBRIEFS, Jan. 1998. See
generally KIMBERLY BANDY & STEPHEN GRIMES, PRIVATE CONTRACTS, PUBLIC SERVICES: WEIGHING
THE
CHOICES
(1995),
available
at
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/private.pdf.
49. See Administration Support For Insourcing and Increasing Investment in the
United
States,
WHITE
HOUSE
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/1_10_2012_fact_sheet_on_past_suppo
rt_for_insourcing_final_2.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
50. Thus, William Novak relates privatization to larger policy trends, referring to
the turn to privatization [as] the tendency of policymakers to increasingly
rely on the private sector, through out-sourcing, contracting, disinvestment,
and the selling and leasing of governmental properties and resources, to meet
obligations formerly thought of as distinctly public. Part of a larger set of
neoliberal policy shifts that includes deregulation and an increased reliance
on market mechanisms, this preference for exploring private over public
solutions has permeated current policy issues ranging from international
security and prisons to welfare and public health to highways and public
parks.
William Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 23; see also Michelman, supra
note 7, at 1063 (“‘Privatization’ [refers to] . . . roughly, a shift toward provision by
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When privatization takes the form of outsourcing, it is also a form of
deregulation. Deregulation in the form of outsourcing is one of the
predominant modes of domestic regulatory reform today, such that
private firms now provide many services once provided by
governments.51 Privatization and its close cousin, deregulation, are the
hallmarks of U.S. regulation, in what author Alfred Aman has called the
era of globalization.52
Early signs of the global era were the attempts to substitute marketoriented rules for New Deal-like regulatory regimes that began as early
as the Carter Administration53 and accelerated greatly under the
Reagan and Bush Administrations in the 1980s. The nature of this
process is perhaps best exemplified by the reforms that occurred at the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) at that time.54
Throughout the 1980s, the FCC recalibrated its regulatory approaches
to replace New Deal regulatory actions with more market-oriented

nongovernmental organizations of certain classes of goods and services, or
performance by those organizations of certain classes of functions, for the provision or
performance of which we’ve been accustomed to relying exclusively or mainly on
government offices and agencies.”).
51. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn
eds., 2014). Privatization as it is practiced in the United States can sometimes result in
a complete form of deregulation, as when Congress deregulated the price of oil at the
wellhead. But deregulation can also include outsourcing since this approach seeks to
substitute private actors and firms for government employees and administrative
agencies. For a detailed discussion of deregulation and the ways that administrative
agencies responded to and shaped the global era of regulation, see AMAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra, note 16, at 47–53; Aman, Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra note 16, at
1153–64.
52. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 51. Viewed through the
lens of the history of regulation in the United States, neoliberalization as an approach
to globalization may be seen as a successor to earlier eras marked by their own iconic
regulatory trends—the natural monopoly regulation of the New Deal era, and the
tragedy of the commons that so absorbed regulators during the Environmental Era.
But any such comparisons also highlight key differences. One difference is the role of
Congress—much less direct now than it was when the reforms of the New Deal and the
Environmental Era were put in place. Both of those eras were typified by major
legislation passed by Congress, whereas today’s deregulatory reforms and their
calibrations come primarily through administrative agencies and presidential
executive orders. See Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the
Administrative Presidency, supra note 16, at 1108–41 (providing a detailed history of
these regulatory periods); see also AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra,
note 16, at 42–43.
53. See AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 93; Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Deregulation in the United States: Transition to the Promised Land, A New Regulatory
Paradigm, or Back to the Future?, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 267 (Damien Geradin ed., 2000).
54. AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 53–62.
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rules. For the most part, courts allowed this, recognizing that the
broad public interest language of New Deal statutes such as the
Communications Act of 1934 allowed the agency the flexibility to
substitute a new conception of what the public’s interest required,
especially in light of changes in the structure and competitive capacity
of the industries involved.55
Environmental regulation reform followed a somewhat similar
regulatory reform path, as market regulatory approaches gradually
replaced so-called command and control rules.56 Once again, though
the statutes involved were not as open-ended as New Deal legislation,
there was enough interpretive room in many cases to introduce
market means toward regulatory ends. There were limits to this
approach,57 but for the most part agencies themselves did most of the
deregulating involved. The New Deal regulation of markets in the
public interest left as part of its legacy a discourse in which
deregulation in today’s different economic circumstances is now
similarly justified by some as if it were a corrective swing of the
regulatory pendulum. However, the image of the swinging pendulum
understates the differences between the Depression era and the
current economic environment.
A major difference between those earlier regulatory eras and our
own is that natural monopolies and the tragedy of the commons
involved market failures, in which the government sought to protect
the public’s interest by intervening in particular market sectors. In the
global era, the focal point of regulation is not market failure per se, but
competitiveness on a global scale, resulting in a comprehensive
transformation of the rationales for government itself.
The
neoliberalization of government means reformulating the government
as a market actor suited to competition on a global scale—one
appropriations budget, one agency, one entitlement at a time (to
choose just some examples). Such transformations are responsive to
political pressures—including strong populist pressures—to maximize

55. There were limits to how far the Supreme Court would go with agency
deregulation. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225
(1994) (concluding that the statutory term “modify” connotes only moderate change,
not complete deregulation).
56. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 24–41, 47.
57. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
30 (1983) (holding that the agency could not rescind its rule requiring airbags without
providing adequate reasons for this decision).
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the circulation of wealth by eliminating, to the extent possible, the
fixed costs of government.58
Among the reasons for the popularity of privatized approaches to
the provision of government services is a basic, often untested,
assumption that efficiencies will result from competition attainable
only in the private sector. We call this “the efficiency story.” The
efficiency story rests on three premises: first, that government services
are characteristically unduly encumbered with unnecessary costs and
so-called red tape; second, that market competition produces a sort of
Darwinian effect of favoring the fittest; and third, that competition is
consistently a feature of private sector markets.
None of these premises is valid in relation to the prison sector. With
respect to the relativity of public and private efficiency, a popular
assumption promoted by the industry is that private prisons are more
cost-efficient than public prisons. However, more neutral studies, for
example, a 2001 report under the auspices of the Bureau of Justice
Assistance (BJA),59 indicate that the cost differential between private
and public prisons is minimal.60 With regard to market competition:
the prison market consists of few private sector providers and only
very limited competition (in prison privatization, two main firms
among approximately a score of others).61 These providers are a
subset of the larger and more rapidly growing private security

58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing post-Fordist capitalism);
see also Alfred C. Aman, The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 769, 787
(1998).
59. The BJA, a federal agency charged with monitoring prisons and other aspects of
the U.S. justice system, was established by the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, §§ 401–08, 98 Stat. 1837, 2080–85.
60. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii, 59 (comparing industry “proponents”
claims to twenty percent savings over public prisons, with a BJA study showing savings
closer to one percent, largely due to lower labor costs, and indicating other potential
gains with respect to private prisons, especially the relatively greater openness of
private prison administrators to positive reforms). Overall, studies comparing the
relative cost efficiency of public and private prisons are not conclusive, even to some
advocates of privatization. See Geoffrey Segal, Comparing the Performance of Private
and
Public
Prisons,
REASON
FOUND.
(Apr.
4,
2008),
http://www.reason.org/news/show/comparing-the-performance-of-p.html.
61. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4. For the entrepreneurial history of the
major corporations involved in international, federal, state, and local privatization in
the corrections sector, see The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA,
http://www.cca.com/our-history (last visited June 23, 2014); The Wackenhut
Corporation History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/the-wackenhut-corporation-history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); see also
discussion infra Part II.
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industry.62 With regard to competition: the major public-private
partnerships in the corrections field have long histories of multi-sided
relationships. But competitiveness is not a fixed notion, nor is it
automatically limited to strictly economic issues.
Privatization advocates have framed their appeals largely in terms
of benefits to national, state, and local economies, while remaining
relatively silent on the global context that today defines the very terms
of economic competitiveness. The purpose of this subsection has been
to highlight the extent to which a global context is subsumed within
the idea of competitiveness itself.
C.

Private Prisons and the Myth of Efficiency

Let us now return to prison privatization, in light of the observations
in the previous sections. The discussion so far suggests that
outsourcing in the United States occupies a dynamic political space
brought about by the diversity of ways in which government is today
positioned in relation to private enterprise on a global scale. There is a
vein of contradiction that runs through this space. On the one hand,
core governmental functions impose obligations on government
budgets. On the other hand, governments are also held to account—
administratively and by electorates—to minimizing those budgets and,
directly or indirectly, the functions they support. Seen in this light,
privatization in the form of outsourcing is, in effect, a structural
compromise—maintaining governmental functions while performing
them through the private sector.
Including prison privatization within the ambit of privatization
overall was critical to the privatization movement’s strategists, for
whom “the ideological stakes in the debate over correctional
contracting [were] high.”63 For at least some critics, the sticking point
was not privatization per se, but, more concretely, the risk of
introducing new vested interests into the criminal justice system.64
For others, with the privatization of prisons apparently now “here to

62. See DONAHUE, supra note 3, on the relative weakness of the private prison
market.
63. LOGAN, supra note 5, at 5.
64. See Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the
Privatization of Prisons, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 86 (Gary W. Bowman
et al. eds., 1993); see also SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 77–104 (detailing a
range of vested interests in a variety of prison contracts, including the real estate
investment trust arrangements of the main private corrections firms (guaranteeing tax
relief to the firms and a large return on profits to shareholders), and the IPO offerings
of all the U.S. corrections firms that sell shares on the stock exchange)).
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stay,”65 the concern is the emergence of a new bureaucratic form—
only ambiguously accountable to the public—at the conjuncture of
government and business, broadening the scope of the state into everexpanding areas of the private sector.66 These contradictions and the
complex environment within which private prisons function require
that we revisit the rationales for prison privatization.
1.

Revisiting the Rationales for Privatizing Prisons

Prison privatization emerged as a subject of debate among
academics, advocates, and policy makers in the late 1980s—a time
when prisons were dramatically overcrowded, with pressures building
in favor of experimentation with new forms of funding to
accommodate the radical increase in demand for prison space. In his
classic account, David Garland analyzes this period as marked by a
dramatic and comprehensive shift in crime policy and public attitudes
on both sides of the Atlantic—abandoning older ideas of rehabilitation
in favor of punishment.67

65. See Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality and Accountability in
Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868 (2002). On privatization as a durable
element of corrections, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 339–40.
66. Sarah Armstrong calls it “entrepreneurial bureaucracy.” Sarah Armstrong,
Punishing Not-For-Profit: Implications of Nonprofit Privatization in Juvenile Punishment,
4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 345, 347 (2002). For Shichor and Gilbert, the relevant term is
“subgovernment.” See David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert, Introduction to PRIVATIZATION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2. On the extension of the state
into the entrepreneurial sector through prison privatization and alternatives to
incarceration, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 322.
67. For an analysis of mass incarceration in the context of transnational neoliberal
capitalism, see David Downes, The Macho Penal Economy: Mass Incarceration in the
United States—a European Perspective, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 51, 51–65 (David Garland ed., 2001). See generally NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME
CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARD GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE (3d ed. 2000); GARLAND, supra at
note 19; THOMAS MATHIESEN, PRISON ON TRIAL (1990); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE:
PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993) [hereinafter SIMON,
POOR DISCIPLINE]; Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implication, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992);
Jonathan Simon, Rise of the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 471 (2007) [hereinafter Simon,
Rise of the Carceral State]. On mass incarceration in the United States, see generally
Natasha A. Frost & Todd R. Clear, Understanding Mass Incarceration as a Grand Social
Experiment, 47 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 159 (2009); Michelle S. Phelps,
Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison
Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33 (2011). Austin and Coventry suggest that given the
intensity of contemporary cost-efficiency pressures, there is “little need” for industry
promoters to make claims regarding their rehabilitative capacity. See AUSTIN &
COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 13. On mass incarceration in the United Kingdom, see
generally GARLAND, supra note 19; Genders, supra note 4.
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Discussion of prison privatization usually begins with the
convergence of three developments: a burgeoning prison population,
economic pressures on government coffers, and the mood of the
electorate (e.g., pressing for more effective prosecution of street crime
and longer sentences, and resistance to adding to tax burdens with
construction of new facilities for inmates). This is a standard narrative
well established in academic and policy literatures. In this context, it is
worth emphasizing that the explosion of population growth in jails and
prisons was not due to a general rise in criminal activity. Rather, it was
due to specific policy shifts that expanded criminalization, particularly
of drug offenses, and approaches to punishment embodied by so-called
three-strikes laws. The legislative sources are the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 (which created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, whose guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987)
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1984 and 1987.68 These Acts resulted
in new convictions, longer sentences and reduced availability of
parole—filling prisons well beyond their designed capacity.69
The spike in federal incarceration in the decade between the late
1980s and the late 1990s is generally ascribed to the increase in
convictions of non-violent drug offenders under the 1984 and 1988
legislation cited above. By the end of 1997, sixty-eight percent of all
minimum-security federal prisoners were non-violent drug
offenders.70 At the state level, forty-four percent of the increase in the
prison population between 1986 and 1991 was due to the rise in nonviolent drug offense incarcerations.71 In South Carolina correctional
facilities alone, between 1989 and 1993, there was a thirty-three
percent increase in inmates.72 By 2001, a Department of Justice report

68. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1976; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181. The
periodization of the dramatic rise in the inmate population to the effects of this
legislation is well established by the separate studies of mass incarceration. See Gary
W. Bowman et al., Introduction to PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 65,
at 1–2; see also Hallett, supra note 40, at 371. See generally GARLAND, supra note 19;
Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20; SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 68.
69. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1. Meanwhile,
Congress continued to hold hearings on prison crowding, considering
recommendations for reducing incarcerations by promoting alternatives to prison,
such as electronic supervision, split sentences, half-way houses, and privatization.
70. JOANNE O’BRYANT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92061, PRISONS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR
CONGRESS 7 (2000).
71. See id.
72. See GEORGE SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICAN PRISONS: JOINT VENTURES
WITH
THE
PRIVATE
SECTOR
5
(1995),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/workampr.pdf.
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estimated that some two million inmates were incarcerated in the
United States.73
Pressure against capacity became a persuasive rationale for
privatization, at least among policy makers. The policy scenario
includes expanding accommodations for inmates with minimal
investment on the part of government, by virtue of the government’s
participation in corrections as a client rather than as provider. One
way to build new prisons without raising taxes is to outsource their
construction and management to private firms. Private firms pay the
upfront construction costs and amortize them over a number of years.
In this way, new prisons can be built without significantly affecting
state taxes or budgets, although, as Hallett points out, taxpayers are
involved eventually in all state expenditures.74
Since at least the 1970s—well prior to the crowding crisis of the late
1980s—federal capacity shortages were chronic in an episodic way,
resulting in periodic demands for Congressional appropriations for
Bureau of Prisons budgets and authorizations for new construction. In
1975, for example, Congressional hearings on the shortage of federal
capacity considered a recommendation to transfer all federal prisoner
administration to the states—along with other recommendations
(some of them still under consideration today) regarding alternatives
to incarceration.75
Congressional moratoria on new prison
construction and reductions in block grants to states strained the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and state agencies prior to the dramatic
spike in the inmate population that has been well-noted for the later
1980s and subsequently.76
But one should not assume that prison privatization originated as an
initiative within the government; it was an idea that circulated
between actors in government and business firms long before the first
private prisons were authorized. The development of the market for
73. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii.
74. See Hallett, supra note 40, at 376.
75. Federal Bureau of Prisons Institutions Prison: Construction Plans and Policy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 383 (1975), available at
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1975-hjh0027?accountid=13314 (login required).
76. The importance of Congressional attempts to discipline the Bureau of Prisons
with funding limits and bans on new construction in the 1970s is two-fold: one, to
highlight the relevance of states as resources available to the federal government to
address deficiencies at the federal level, and two, to underscore the extent to which the
public’s later reluctance to fund new prison construction with bond issues followed
Congressional action. See supra notes 99–107. On reductions of block grants to states,
see SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–16, tbl.1.3.
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private prison services and management was complex over at least a
decade prior to the initiatives that resulted in the full privatization of
prisons—multi-faceted collaborations between federal, state, and local
governments, and the private sector: businesses developing their
competitive capacity and promoting their services while governments
(in effect) warranted their investment by delivering legislation that
allows for contracts in those service sectors.77 A governmental
Request for Proposals (RFP), which solicits bids for a contract, is in this
sense the culmination of a collaboration, not the beginning of one.
Successful bids on contracts are, in turn, warrants (in effect) of the
value of shareholder investment through public offerings. The U.S.
corrections field came into view as an untapped market from within
the fast-paced development of the private security industry in the
1980s,78 and after other countries began to contract for security and
corrections facilities with U.S. corporations.79 It is not surprising that
“the market” may consist of very few firms. Within the United States,
the vast majority of prison privatization contracts have been awarded
to just two firms: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and The
GEO Group (GEO) (formerly Wackenhut Corrections Corporation).80
These are large corporations that build and operate private prisons,
among other services and products that pre-dated the emergence of
opportunities for private prison construction and management.81
77. See SELLERS, supra note 36; see also SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 89–90,
101.
78. See BECKETT supra note 35, at 101. For a state-level case study of the
complexities of private interests in law and order, see Michael C. Campbell, Politics,
Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of “Law and Order”
Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2011).
79. GEO’s website gives prominence to its contracts elsewhere in the Englishspeaking world—South Africa, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Indeed, GEO had
extensive international clients prior to the expansion of its corrections sector in the
United
States.
See
Historic
Milestones,
GEO
GROUP,
INC.,
http://www.geogroup.com/history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); see also The
Wackenhut Corporation History, supra note 62.
80. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4, tbl.3. For the entrepreneurial history
of one major corporation involved in international, federal, state, and local
privatization in the corrections sector, see The Wackenhut Corporation History, supra
note 62.
81. GEO was founded in 1984, Historic Milestones, supra note 80, and now runs 106
facilities around the world, claiming a cost savings of thirty percent over the public
sector. Welcome to the GEO Group, Inc., GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/ (last
updated 2014). Its first federal partnership was with ICE in 1987, in connection with
the Aurora ICE Processing Center. Historic Milestones, supra note 80. Its first federal
contract to build and run an entire prison involved the demonstration project
discussed below, at the Taft Correctional Institution, in California. See id. CCA has been
a long-time participant in public-private sector dialogues over prison privatization
(including Congressional hearings and the President’s Commission on Privatization,
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The Chronology of Prison Privatization

The efficiency story usually associated with discussions of prison
privatization has two elements—inmate crowding and cost control.
However, as indicated in the previous section, it is not at all clear that
prison privatization—at its inception—followed the dramatic increase
in prosecutions in the late 1980s that led to higher rates of conviction
and incarceration, and prison crowding. A more agnostic view of the
crowding crisis would acknowledge that prison crowding was the
result of federal policies, not, initially, their justification. Indeed, the
rationales for prison privatization were developed—in think tanks,
boardrooms, and private offices—at least a decade before the current
overcrowding crisis became evident in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Support for prison privatization among politicians and policy makers
emerged earlier than—and independently of—the carceral explosion
and voter resistance to bond issues, even if it later became inseparable
from those developments.82
At this same time, just ahead of the prison crowding crisis, crime
and fear of crime became political issues as successive Republican
Party platforms claimed policy credit for declines in the crime rate in
1984 and 1988, as the Reagan and Bush Administrations expanded the
scope of criminalization.83 The strategic gambit of controlling crime
while controlling budgets continued throughout the 1990s. The
Republican Party’s platform in 1992 promoted privatization under the
rubric of “managing government in the public interest”; it also noted
President Bush’s freeze on regulation, new taxes, and commitment to
balancing the budget.84 The pledge to expand privatization continued
in the Republican Party’s platform in 1996, under the rubric of

cited below). GEO’s CEO, George C. Zoley, has been active in promoting prison
privatization to government since the early to mid-1980s. See id.
82. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 1990 budget submission called for doubling
prison capacity by 1995. The federal inmate population increased by fifty percent
between 2000 and 2012—more than double the Bureau of Prisons’ targeted rate for
reducing crowding. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-743, BUREAU OF PRISONS:
GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF AND INFRASTRUCTURES 1
(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf.
On the
disconnections between political decision-making and the problems affecting the
prison system, see Janus, supra note 65, at 86.
83. The Republican platforms mentioned declines in the crime rate in both years.
See Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25845 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014);
Republican Party Platform of 1988, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 16, 1988),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
84. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 17, 1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (last visited June 22, 2014).
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“streamlining government.”85
But streamlining government, in
practice, primarily took the form of reductions of federal grants to
states.86
The practice of setting budget restrictions and imposing moratoria
on new construction were consistent with strategies outlined by the
GAO as likely to “encourage” agency managers to take privatization
seriously:
Governments may need to enact legislative changes and/or reduce
resources available to government agencies in order to encourage
greater use of privatization. Georgia, for example, enacted legislation
to reform the state’s civil service and to reduce the operating funds of
state agencies. Virginia reduced the size of the state’s workforce and
enacted legislation to establish an independent state council to foster
privatization efforts. These actions, officials told us, sent a signal to
managers and employees that political leaders were serious about
implementing privatization.87

Even with this surge of political interest in crime, prisons filling
beyond capacity, and campaigns to promote privatization within the
government, uptake of the private prison option was apparently slow
to take hold. A brief on prisons by the Congressional Research Service
in 2000 indicates that the idea of contracting private management for
the entirety of a prison’s operations was new and “controversial.”88
GAO reports at the time indicated that a key concern was a perceived
lack of clear statutory authority for outsourcing; fear of walkouts and
strikes on the part of private sector prison staff were among the
concerns raised by critics.89 In the United States today, roughly ten

85. See Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 12, 1996),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848 (last visited Nov. 10,
2014). Earlier Republican platforms did not mention privatization. In 1996, the
director of the Bureau of Prisons, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, supported privatization in
her budget request on the grounds that it would be a means of complying with the
Federal Workforce Restructuring Act, without reducing prison capacity.
For
information on Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, see Historical Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Her successor, Harley G. Lappin (Director of the Bureau of Prisons from 2003 to 2011),
left the government to take a position as Executive Vice-President and Chief
Corrections Officer at CCA. On Lappin’s move to the private sector, see PA Prison
Report, HUM. RTS. COALITION, (June 13, 2011), http://www.hrcoalition.org/node/144.
86. See SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–15.
87. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-87, PRIVATIZATION: QUESTIONS STATE
AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKERS USED WHEN CONSIDERING PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS 12 (1998),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/198870.pdf.
88. See O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 8.
89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS:
STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE: REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM.
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percent of all prison and jail inmates are housed in privatized
facilities—approximately 200,000 individuals.90 Approximately ten
percent of federal inmates are housed in private facilities.91 By 2001,
there were 158 private prison facilities in the United States.92 Most
states have at least one private prison, with the largest numbers of
privatized facilities in California, Florida, and Texas.93 Privatized
detention facilities have also developed for the detention of juveniles
and unregistered immigration.94
Some states were ahead of the federal government in their
experiments with privatization, encouraged in part by President Bush’s
authorization to states and local governments receiving federal aid to
privatize.95 By 1996, the GAO reported that “some states [had]
contracted with private corporations for prison operations.”96 The
fiscal year 1996 budget of the Federal Bureau of Prisons expanded its
request for appropriations in this area.97 Finally, in 1997, GEO was
awarded a five-year demonstration project to build and manage a
private prison in Taft, California, bringing to fruition a long campaign,
involving multiple parties within the federal government and in the
private sector, in support of experimentally expanding the role of the
private sector in corrections.98
In sum, several policy and political developments converged to
create the conditions that yielded prison privatization: a broad-based
policy search for alternatives to incarceration;99 constraints on supply
in the form of court-ordered ceilings on prison population in states;100

CRIME,
COMM.
OF
THE
JUDICIARY
1
(1996),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf.
90. On total prison and jail population, see Prison Privatization, supra note 19. On
federal prison population, see Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 6.
ON

91. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 6–7.
92. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii. The same report indicates that
3100 inmates were housed in private prisons worldwide in 1987, and 132,000
worldwide in 1998. Id.
93. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 90, at 40 tbl.IV.1. For analyses of
citing decisions suggest the complexity of such processes, see generally Mona Lynch,
Punishment, Purpose, and Place: A Case Study of Arizona’s Prison Siting Decisions, 50
STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 105 (2009).
94. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19.
95. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, supra note 86.
96. O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 1.
97. See id at 6.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1, 7.
100. See TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE & MICHAEL D. REISIG, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 474
(10th ed. 2013) (discussing court-ordered ceilings).
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failed bond issues for prison construction in states and
municipalities;101 fluctuating appropriations to federal and state
agencies;102 congressional caps on the federal budget and restrictions
on new prison construction;103 rising demand resulting from
Congressional legislation mandating new areas of federal prosecution
and specific sentencing guidelines;104 and a Congressional mandate
that shifted all D.C. prisoners into the federal system.105 Prison
privatization became a new area of venture capital106 as privatization
more broadly took hold as a philosophical/political commitment107—

101. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19.
102. O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 2.
103. See JAMES, supra note 13, at 30 (“[R]ecent reductions in funding for the New
Construction decision unit . . . mean that the BOP will lack the funding to begin any new
prison construction in the near future, which could result in increased overcrowding in
the federal prison system if the federal prison population does not continue to
decrease . . . .”).
104. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONRGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf.
105. See
Inmate
Legal
Matters,
FED.
BUREAU
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/legal_matters.jsp (“The National
Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 transferred
responsibility of District of Columbia Code felony offenders to the BOP.”).
106. See The Prison Boom Produces Privatization, CORRECTIONS PROJECT,
http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited June 17,
2014).
107. The first two wholly private prisons under contract to the federal government
were in Leavenworth, Kansas. On Leavenworth, see J. Duncan Moore, Federal Prison To
Be Built, Run By Private Firms, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1990, at A10. Leavenworth is a
project of the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA specializes in maximum
security, and is the fifth largest corrections system in the United States (after its
competitor, GEO, and three states). It manages sixty-one facilities nationwide. See See
CCA’s Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, CCA, https://www.cca.com/locations
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014). In 1990, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons was Michael
Quinlan (director 1987–1992), whose previous professional experience included
service as executive assistant to the warden at Leavenworth Penitentiary. See J.
Michael
Quinlan,
FED.
BUREAU
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Leavenworth is currently under contract to the U.S. Marshalls Service. See U.S. Facts
Sheet, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/general1209.html (last visited June 22, 2014). Taft Correctional Institution was established by
Congress in 1997, as a five-year federal demonstration project, under contract with
GEO. See Historic Milestones, supra note 80. A demonstration project of this kind was a
longstanding recommendation of the GAO. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA)/GGD91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: COST SAVINGS AND BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED
4–5 (1991), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-1BR, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION’S
PRISON SYSTEMS 19 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/77582.pdf; see
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 5. The project evaluation was
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both developments taking place prior to the crowding of prisons and
funding and resource shortages that are the more usual start to
narratives on this subject. An appropriate chronology is key to
understanding the context of prison privatization in relation to
neoliberal globalization, and its current stakes in human terms.
To conclude Part I, we suggest that while there is obvious relevance
to the fact of prison crowding and the reality of taxpayer resistance to
funding expansions of government obligations, one must consider the
possibility that the loss of political support for funding the government
and the popularity of marketization were the result of the neoliberal
policies rather than its driving cause. In our view, explaining the
origins of prison privatization in the situation of underfunding and
overcrowding risks mistakes effects as causes.
By 1988, the push to privatize prisons, in one form or another,
involved every branch of government at the highest levels, revealing
significant tensions between them, as well as between and within the
two main political parties. It is crucial to appreciate the differences
between the visions and values that guided these efforts; this is the
theme of Part II.
II. PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND PRISON LABOR
The previous discussion argues for lengthening the chronology of
prison privatization so as to include the privatization movement in
history in an integral way. Doing so adds at least a decade to the story.
It also broadens and enriches the context around prison privatization,
to include more of the complex social, legal, and political tectonics of
the period. Prisons were at the crux of the contradictory crosscurrents
discussed above, as demand for stronger measures against offenders
(and corresponding demand for new prisons) was at odds with the
simultaneous demand for leaner government and brakes on public
expenditure. Whatever the appeal of privatization as a structural
compromise in theory, the substantive consequences were dramatic as
a practical matter. Rates of imprisonment soared even as crime rates
declined.108 Concerned by the unprecedented levels of incarceration
contracted to a private consulting firm, Abt Associates. See DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD &
KENNETH CARLSON, ABT ASSOCS., INC., CONTRACTING FOR IMPRISONMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
COST AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY OPERATED TAFT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION v (2005),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211990.pdf.
108. On privatization as part of the context for mass imprisonment, see GARLAND,
supra note 19, at 131–35. The phrase “mass imprisonment”—now in general usage—
was Garland’s coinage. In Garland’s analysis, mass imprisonment—“the systematic
imprisonment of whole groups” (in the United States, young black men)—was the
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that heavily disfavored young black men, some socio-legal scholars
saw the situation as a fundamental transformation of state and
society—as prisons filled with young men who had been displaced
from the labor force in a new climate in which economic risk was
displaced onto workers, for whom persistent under- and
unemployment became the norm.109 However, crime policies turned
away from rehabilitation, and increasingly toward confinement and
punishment.110 As David Garland observes, incarceration was no
longer a matter of reforming individual offenders, but of newly normal
selective effects that made prison “a shaping institution for whole
sectors of the population.”111
These were major changes; however, from the vantage points
afforded by the longer timeframe we propose for prison privatization,
the budget constraints and prison overcrowding subsequent to the late
1980’s may be seen as relatively late developments. The prison crisis
may account for the conditions that made prison privatization (like
privatization more generally) politically saleable, but the context, the
idea, its rationales and strategies for implementation, and even the
firms themselves were already explicitly circulating by that time. In
this Part, we look to that earlier period—to two earlier prison reform
initiatives that are part of the longer history that made privatization
integral to the globalization of capital. Both initiatives involve prison
labor. Their similarities and differences are relevant to an analysis of
privatization as entailing diverse means and ends, as well as diverse
political locations within and beyond government.
These initiatives were Federal Prison Industries, now known as
“UNICOR,” and Prison Industry Enhancement, or PIE. UNICOR is a
“overdetermined outcome of a converging series of policies and decisions” that
included prison privatization and “Reaganomics.” David Garland, Introduction: The
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 68, at 2 [hereinafter Garland, Introduction].
109. On the need for attention to the restructuring of the economy, see McLennan,
The New Penal State, supra note 23, at 407, 415. On income inequality, see generally
Martina Morris & Bruce Western, Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 623 (1999). On globalization, see generally Ruth Wilson
Gilmore, Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to postKeynesian Militarism, 40 RACE & CLASS 171 (1998/1999).
110. Major analyses are now classics in socio-legal studies. In addition to GARLAND,
supra note 19 and MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 68.
See generally CHRISTIE, supra note 68; MATHIESEN, supra note 68; SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE,
supra note 68; Feeley & Simon, supra note 68; Simon, Rise of the Carceral State, supra
note 68. On privatization and welfare policy, see Downes, supra note 68, 61–63; see
also JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE
FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 73–108 (2014).
111. Garland, Introduction, supra note 109, at 1.
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government owned corporation that manages inmate production of
goods and services available for sale to the government and, under
some circumstances, on the open market.112 In its current incarnation,
UNICOR is a form of outsourcing in the sense that it draws on labor
segregated from the domestic labor force by a state border (i.e., prison
walls) that demarcates a legal differential of wages and hours, among
other things.113 UNICOR is not a private enterprise, but it has been
increasingly pressed to “act” like a private sector firm since its reestablishment by Congress as a self-supporting agency in 1988, and
on-going pressures in the direction of increased competition and
absorption of financial risk.114
By contrast, PIE brings private firms into prisons, giving private
sector employers access to inmates as a work force.115 UNICOR
produces goods and services for an essentially governmentallyguaranteed market (as we shall see); PIE relies on the open market.116
Together, consideration of these programs (discussed separately in the
following sections) lends fresh prominence to the role of labor in
relation to privatization in the prison context. Once the integral
relation of prison labor and global capital is appreciated, prison
privatization and the new pressures on labor to absorb the risk in
economic fluctuations may be understood in turn as related
developments. By attending to the government’s diverse efforts to
position prison labor in relation to privatization, the connections
between globalization, privatization, and prisons are themselves
clarified—in turn clarifying the context of prison reform as entailing
issues beyond prisons, particularly in relation to the vulnerability of
the labor force to fluctuating market conditions.

112. UNICOR,
FED.
BUREAU
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/unicor.jsp.
113. See
Prison
Labor:
Outsourcing’s
“Best
Kept
Secret,”
CIO.COM,
http://www.cio.com/article/2417888/outsourcing/prison-labor--outsourcing-s-best-kept-secret-.html (“Since 1999, private corporations in the U.S. have outsourced a
variety of business services to federal prison inmates, who today earn around $1 an
hour for call center work. Proponents of the practice claim prison labor is a low-cost
alternative to offshore outsourcing, but critics say it takes jobs away from law-abiding
U.S. citizens.”).
114. Cf. Nate C. Hindman, Unicor Under Fire for Dominating Small Competitors with
Cheap Prison Labor, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 12:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/unicor-prison-labor_n_1778765.html.
115. See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM BRIEF: PRISON
INDUSTRY
ENHANCEMENT
CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM
(2004),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/203483.pdf.
116. See id. at 3 (describing program criteria, including “[a]uthority to involve the
private sector in the production and sale of inmate-made goods on the open market”).,
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Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE)

PIE is a key development in prison privatization that dates from the
1970s, ultimately taking the form of the Prison Industry Enhancement
Certification Program (PIECP) in 1979. PIECP is a federal program set
up under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979117—legislation
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), with co-sponsors from
both sides of the aisle.118 The Act set up the main federal agencies
charged with research and evaluation of criminal justice programs,
including corrections: the National Institute of Justice, the National
Criminal Justice Research Center, the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.119 The final
section of the Act set up the PIECP, a program designed to give
authorization, on a limited and prescribed basis, to state and local
corrections agencies to contract with private sector firms for purposes
of running those firms’ operations within prisons.120
Subsequently expanded to offer broader participation, eligibility for
enhanced prison industry certification entails specific conditions. In
particular, if prison-made goods are to be sold on the open market,
wages must be on a par with other local producers, and there must be
no displacement of local workers.121 These restrictions have tended to
reinforce niche production, i.e., in sectors where there is no local
competition. Partners must further demonstrate that their venture
will not impair existing contracts.122 Labor unions must be informed
and consulted.123 Once certification is complete, the PIE model
involves two main features. First, it brings a private sector enterprise

117. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96–157, 93 Stat. 1167 (1979).
118. The bill was co-sponsored by Republican Robert McClory of Illinois. H.R. 2061
(96th):
Justice
System
Improvement
Act
of
1979,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hr2061 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
119. About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu.
120. Individual enhanced prison industry programs set up under PIECP are known
by the nickname “PIE”—for Prison Industry Enhancement. Description of the Act,
PIECP, and individual PIEs is based on the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167. The best and most comprehensive analysis of PIECP,
and a detailed assessment of South Carolina’s experience with PIE, is an unpublished
doctoral dissertation by Marie Fajardo Ragghianti. Marie Fajardo Ragghianti, Prison
Industries in South Carolina: 1996-2005, Why and How the PIE Model Prospered 128–
232
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8178/1/umi-umd-5360.pdf;
see
also
SEXTON, supra note 73.
121. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 187.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 46.
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fully within the prison walls, to be run on standard business principles,
for profit.124 Second, prisoners are employees of the company, earning
wages that are subject to various forms of withholding (FICA, Medicaid,
taxes, child support, and required personal savings for the inmate’s
use, post-release).125 There are a variety of employment models; some
inmates work directly for the company, while others are employed by
prison management and assigned to the company. States write their
own guidelines for enhanced prison industry programs.126
Uptake of PIE has been selective—perhaps an indication of the
particularity of the circumstances favoring such joint ventures.127 The
most successful PIEs in terms of private sector response and
profitability of their enterprises are in South Carolina, Kansas, and
Texas.128 South Carolina’s program has been the largest and most
successful program from the outset in the vanguard of recruiting
private sector ventures and developing successful partnerships with
firms.129 In South Carolina, the Division of Corrections Industries’
private sector partners include Fortune 500 companies such as Escod
Industries (a cable manufacturing firm whose clients include IBM), as
well as commercial enterprises that include Third Generation (a luxury
lingerie manufacturer for retailers such as Victoria’s Secret and J.C.
Penney) and Jostens, Inc. (the nation’s largest manufacturer of
graduation gowns).130 Other states have successfully engaged other
partners. California’s enhanced prison industry ventures at one time
included a Trans World Airlines reservations call center in a youth
detention center.131 Arizona’s ventures included a Best Western
reservation call center in a women’s prison.132 Connecticut’s included

124. See HERRAIZ, supra note 115, at 3 (“The program provides a stable and readily
available workforce. In addition, many correctional agencies provide manufacturing
space to private-sector companies involved in the program.”).
125. ISee id. at 3 (“Corrections departments may opt to take deductions from inmate
worker wages. Permissible deductions are limited to taxes, room and board, family
support, and victims’ compensation.”).
126. Ragghianti ascribes some of South Carolina’s success to the Division of
Corrections Industries director’s inclusion of organized labor in a revision of the state
guidelines. Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 157. In some states, guidelines were less
well received; the Washington State Supreme Court declared the state’s PIE
unconstitutional. Wash. Water Jet Ski Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42 (Wash.
2004); see Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 273–76.
127. See generally SEXTON, supra note 72.
128. Figures are as of 2008. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 322.
129. See id. at 9.
130. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 7–8.
131. See id. at 9–10.
132. See id. at 9.
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the Chesapeake Cap Company (a manufacturer of baseball caps).133 By
1993, thirty-two correctional agencies were participating in the
private sector market through PIECP.134 By the end of 2000, a total of
some 3700 state inmates were participating in PIE;135 by the end of
2005, 6555 inmates were in the program, bringing the total inmate
participation to 70,000 since its inception.136
In South Carolina and elsewhere, enhanced prison industries under
PIECP are more profitable than the older Federal Prison Industries
program (further discussion below), and both are more profitable than
traditional prison work programs (license plates, road signs, etc.).137
However, the private sector has not been responsive to enhanced
prison industry initiatives in many states, and a study by Thomas
Petersik et al., sponsored by the National Corrections Institute of
America (NCIA) found that the benefits and beneficiaries of prison
industry enhancement are neither well known nor understood.138
The Petersik et al. study remains the principal source on the
question of the benefits of the PIE program. The research team asked
two questions: Who are the financial beneficiaries of PIE wages? And,
what would be the effect of paying PIE employees on par with the
civilian work force? The answer to the first question was very broad.
Petersik et al. found that fifty-three to fifty-seven cents on every dollar
of inmate wages goes to beneficiaries other than the inmate.139 Noninmate beneficiaries prominently include the corrections system, with
approximately one third of inmate wages going to his or her room and
board costs.140 Other beneficiaries include the taxpayers who derive
indirect benefit from reduced pressure on state budgets due to
inmates’ wage contributions. With regard to the effects of improving
wages and expanding the program, Petersik’s team found that PIE’s

133. See id. at 10–11. For additional partnerships, see also FPI Inmate Programs,
UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov/About_FPI_Programs.aspx (last visited Nov. 10,
2014).
134. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 3.
135. See THOMAS W. PETERSIK ET AL., IDENTIFYING BENEFICIARIES OF PIE INCOMES: WHO
BENEFITS FROM WAGE EARNINGS OF INMATES WORKING IN THE PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT
(PIE) PROGRAM 1 (2003), available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wpcontent/uploads/researchfullrpt1.pdf; see also MARILYN C. MOSES & CINDY J. SMITH,
FACTORIES BEHIND FENCES: DO PRISON ‘REAL WORK’ PROGRAMS WORK? 33 (2007), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000257h.pdf.
136. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136.
137. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 12.
138. PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at 7.
139. Id. at xii. PIE inmates in South Carolina have sued over deductions. See
Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 168.
140. See PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at xiii.
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profitability and benefits would likely increase under both
conditions.141
While PIE’s advocates in corrections and in the private sector are
attentive to the prospects for assimilating prison labor into the
economy,142 the thrust of their concerns has mainly been in directions
other than raising wages. PIE offers entrepreneurs a competitive
advantage over the alternative of moving to Mexico or offshore,
depending on the location of a prison factory relative to its markets,
among other factors. One corporate head reported using his PIE plant
for lower-end products (involving low skill), especially in areas of
unsteady demand—reserving higher-end products with steadier
demand for his “civilian” labor force.143 In his view, PIE offered him a
cushion in the global economy, absorbing fluctuations in demand in a
way that allowed his firm to maintain maximum profitability in a
highly competitive global environment. The director of South
Carolina’s PIE program, Tony Ellis, also emphasizes the flexibility of
the prison labor force in his references to PIE as a form of “leased
labor.”144
The conditions that have made PIE successful in South Carolina
involve an approach to prison labor as labor in the global economy.
The small scale of the PIE program, and the relatively small role of
organized labor in South Carolina, feature among these conditions, as
well.145 Following a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, inmate workers
are not allowed to organize, and, under South Carolina state law, have
no private rights in the labor context.146 Proposals to raise wages or
shift to higher-skilled job training (to maximize post-release job
opportunities for inmates) have not prevailed—nor have proposals to
restrict PIE to sectors in which there is no domestic competition (i.e.,
for which there is only an off-shore alternative).147

141. See id. at xvi.
142. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 178.
143. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 6–7, 9 (quoting Pat Timms, Escod’s Vice President
of Operations).
144. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 168, 171 (quoting Tony Ellis).
145. See id. at 168 (quoting Tony Ellis).
146. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977); see also
Susan Blankenship, Revisiting the Democratic Promise of Prisoners’ Labor Unions, 37
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 241 (2005) (proposing that prisoners’ labor unions would give a
constructive voice to inmates in relation to the prison crisis).
147. See, e.g., BARBARA J. AUERBACH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EMERGING PRACTICES: WAGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE PRISON INDUSTRIES ENHANCEMENT
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (PIECP) 2 (2001) (“PIECP wages tend to be set at, or slightly
above, the Federal minimum wage . . . reflecting the entry level, labor intensive nature
of PIECP work.”). Far from limiting production to sectors that lack domestic
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To the extent that PIE delivers financial benefits to individuals
beyond the inmate/employees, the program is apparently most
successful as a sustainability mechanism for corrections agencies, and
least successful when it is set up as a means of revenue generation for
other parts of state budgets.148 In some states, PIE revenues are
diverted by the legislature into other programs besides corrections—a
controversial practice that tends to compromise the viability of PIEs in
those states.149 Such issues and debates underscore the extent to
which PIE should be understood as a privatization initiative shaped by
an ongoing restructuring of state economies within globalization.
The benefits of PIE are not limited to revenue, however. The
program has been presented as contributing to lowered rates of
recidivism and improvements in post-release employment. A 2006
National Institute of Justice study confirmed positive effects for PIE
alumni/ae in terms of higher rates of employment and lower rates of
recidivism than those of inmates whose work experience was in other
prison programs.150 The authors indicate that—given methodological
constraints—these positive outcomes cannot be conclusively
attributed to PIE experience specifically, since inmates are not
randomly assigned to PIE and the other programs.151 Still, they

competition, PIECP operations have included, inter alia, aluminum screen and circuit
board production, glove manufacture, alfalfa production, papaya packing in Hawaii,
potato processing, and boat building. See Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories
Behind Fences: Do Prison ‘Real Work’ Programs Work?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2007),
http://www.nij.gov/journals/257/pages/real-work-programs.aspx.
148. Ragghianti’s study of South Carolina’s experience with PIE emphasizes the
importance of personal and institutional commitment, clarity of objectives, and
continuity as additional factors in PIE success. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 315.
A full section of her dissertation charts the highly effective involvement of Tony Ellis,
director of the state Division of Correction Industries, and former state director of
procurement. See id. at 161–81. Ellis had a long and successful tenure as director of
South Carolina’s PIE program, and was personally involved in recruiting firms.
Ragghianti credits his success with inspiring other southern corrections agencies—
formerly resistant to PIE—to participate. At the time of her writing, Ellis had just
retired, so the long-term success of the South Carolina PIE program beyond his
directorship remained to be seen. See id. at 295, n.33.
149. See id. at 281.
150. See CINDY J. SMITH ET AL., CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES: PREPARING INMATES FOR RE-ENTRY:
RECIDIVISM
AND
POST-RELEASE
EMPLOYMENT
9
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214608.pdf; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra
note 136, at 33–34.
151. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136, at 33. PIE is a voluntary program. South
Carolina’s eligibility requirements include a GED (or current participation in a GED
program) and no recent disciplinary infractions in prison. See Ragghianti, supra note
121, at 104. Overall, Petersik et al. find that PIE inmates tend to serve longer sentences
for more violent crimes, but have a far lower rate of drug-related offenses than the
general prison population. PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at 96, tbl.A5. Longer
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emphasize that PIE yields positive outcomes for inmates after release,
and that it remains an “underutilized option.”152
The NIJ studies of Petersik et al. and Cindy J. Smith et al.153 implicitly
raise the question as to why the PIE model has not been more widely
adopted. Marie Fajardo Ragghianti’s evaluation study points to the gap
between the politics and realities of corrections as one possible
reason154—or rather, a set of reasons including the politicization of a
distinction between rehabilitation and security155 and a pervasive
disregard for benefits to prisoners. In spite of the favorable outcome
assessments by NIJ studies cited above, Congress reduced funding for
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, resulting in cuts to the National
Center on Institutions and Alternatives and, in that connection, to the
PIECP national coordinator’s office.156
The PIE program was saved, but by that time the national politics of
privatization had shifted from the sustainability model offered by PIE
to the revenue-generation model. .157 The difference between these
was, in effect, the difference between treating prisoners as earners in a
sentences mean that PIE inmates may have benefitted from other prison work
programs, and other forms of support. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 302.
152. See PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 136, at 84; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136,
at 34–35.
153. SMITH ET AL., supra note 151.
154. Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 292–93.
155. See id. at 5.
156. See id. at 291.
157. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 869 (2008)
(“‘[P]rison industries’—prison labor programs producing goods or services sold to
other government agencies or to the private sector—are the highest-profile and most
controversial form of prison labor. Since roughly the New Deal era, prison industries
have been tightly regulated, most prominently through the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s
criminal prohibition on the sale of inmate-produced goods in interstate commerce.
Government purchasers always have been exempted, however, as part of the broader
New Deal-era compromise permitting prison labor for ‘state use.’ Limits on other
purchases gradually have relaxed over the past thirty years. Additionally, few
restrictions apply to the growing sale of services performed by prisoners. Today,
prison industries generate $2 billion in revenue annually.” (footnotes omitted); cf.
Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case
Against Sate Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009)
(“Private prisons . . . mimic their public counterparts in one interesting aspect: prison
labor. As in state jail, prisoners confined by the state to a privately owned facility must
perform menial tasks for little to no pay. The point of such work, consequently, is
reformation and rehabilitation. By doing such work in the private context, however,
prisoners directly contribute to the profit-making function of the corporation. At the
very least, therefore, inmate labor in private prisons constitutes ‘involuntary
servitude.’ If the state is characterized as ‘contracting out’ inmates to these
corporations who subsequently aid the prison in earning corporate revenue, the
system begins to resemble a modern day form of slavery.” (footnotes omitted)).
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global economy—with all the precarity of non-inmate workers in their
same employment sector—and prisoners as revenue streams flowing
directly to state treasuries. Debates over parity and efficiency as
competing values in the corrections labor setting remain intense.158
B.

Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) and the Debate Over
Prison Labor

PIE is just one initiative aimed at reforming prison labor—one
whose uptake by states and localities remained highly limited even
after Congress expanded the maximum PIE certifications from seven to
fifty.159 But by far the largest prison industries program is the one run
by the federal government—Federal Prison Industries, Inc., now
known by its trade name UNICOR.160 All federal prisoners are required
to work, unless they are physically unable or exempted as security
risks.161 Most prison work involves inmates in the work of the prison

158. See Matthew J. Lang, The Search for a Workable Standard for When Fair Labor
Standards Act Coverage Should be Extended to Prison Workers, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
191, 194–96 (2002); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-98, PRISONER
LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE 1–2 (1993) available at,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217999.pdf. The GAO’s report is a response to a
request by Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), for a projection as to how paying the minimum
wage to inmate workers would affect the corrections system. Prison professionals
anticipated “millions” of unrecoverable expenses if they were required to pay
minimum wage; other organizations participating in PIE or similar programs saw
advantages in parity. Senator Reid’s request was in the context of a recent Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals three-judge panel holding that prisoners employed in private
companies were employees of the state, entitled to protection under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Reid wanted to know if Congress should specifically exclude
inmate workers from FLSA. Senator Reid subsequently was among the co-sponsors of
a bill to amend the FLSA to exempt prison labor from its provisions; however, the bill
never reached the floor of the Senate. See S. 1943, 104th Cong. (1996).
159. On expansion of the program, see UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov (last visited
June 27, 2014). Even on this expanded scale, participation remains marginal. In 1997,
less than 0.2% of federal prisoners were participating in PIE. See Options to Improve
and Expand Federal Prison Industries: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 59 (1997) [hereinafter Options to Improve and
Expand
Federal
Prison
Industries],
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58956.000/hju58956_0f.htm.
Florida developed its own program, Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified
Enterprises, Inc. (PRIDE) to bring private enterprise into the physical space of state
prisons. See PRIDE, http://www.pride-enterprises.org (last visited June 27, 2014); see
also Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc., FLA. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1011/pride.html (last visited Sept.
28, 2014).
160. See About UNICOR, UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov./about.aspx (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015).
161. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2905, 104 Stat 4789,
4914.
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itself, or in production of goods for other state agencies with limited
market value, such as license plates and road signs, among other
things. This type of prison labor is conventionally referred to as
“traditional” prison labor. UNICOR, which employs about twenty-two
percent of all federal prisoners,162 involves a different model,
conventionally known as “prison industries.”163 Inmates involved in
UNICOR produce goods for sale on the open market—under specific
conditions aimed at minimizing competition with the private sector,
and avoiding displacement of civilian labor. Its market is protected by
a mandatory sourcing rule, requiring all federal agencies to give
preference to UNICOR’s goods and services in their own procurement
practices (with certain exceptions).
UNICOR is the trademark of what is also known as Federal Prison
Industries, Inc. (FPI).164 FPI was established in 1934 by President
Roosevelt as an effort to coordinate prison industries nationwide so as
to minimize disruption of civilian labor in any one sector of
production.165 The program was reauthorized in 1948.166 FPI
supported defense industries during the Second World War, the
Korean War, and the war in Vietnam.167 After the end of the Vietnam
War, it developed a diversified portfolio of goods and services for
sale.168 In some respects, FPI took its modern form as a corporation
(i.e., independent spending authority, without Congressional
appropriation) with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.169
Under this statute, it was required to be self-supporting, and to comply
with several conditions before selling its products on the open
market—legislative efforts that reflected larger concerns with tax
burdens and private sector competitiveness in the national and
international economy.
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., is now known both as FPI, Inc. and
UNICOR. UNICOR’s in-house historical narrative credits Chief Justice
Burger’s “factories with fences” concept as the inspiration for its
current form, although it is not clear that UNICOR represents a specific

162. See UNICOR, supra note 22, at 28.
163. FPI
General
Overviews
FAQs,
UNICOR,
http://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_General.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
164. See id.
165. The FPI was authorize by the Act of June 23, 1934, Pub. L. 73-461, 48 Stat. 1211,
and Exec. Order No. 6917; see also O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 12.
166. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32380, FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES 10
(2007).
167. ROBERT D. HANSER, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 391 (SAGE ed., 2013).
168. Id.
169. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §7011, 102 Stat. 4181, 4395.
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implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations.170 The Chief
Justice’s Task Force is discussed in the next section. One principle
difference between the Task Force recommendations and UNICOR as
practiced is that UNICOR does not claim rehabilitation as its primary
goal; indeed, UNICOR is explicit in stating that rehabilitation is not the
primary goal that it was in the past.171 Rather, UNICOR has adopted
what the website refers to as a “balanced model”—combining
“punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation” with rehabilitation.172
Another key difference involves the prison industries themselves,
which are not owned by the private sector as envisioned in the Task
Force report.
UNICOR is self-supporting, and there is no federal appropriation for
its operations.
The principal source of its revenue is sales.
Approximately seventy-four percent of sales revenues are used for the
purchase of materials.173 Inmates are paid wages, but their net share is
considerably less than that of PIE participants (four percent, compared
to about forty-three to forty-seven percent in PIE).174 Still, UNICOR is
more remunerative for inmates than traditional forms of prison labor;
most wages under traditional prison labor regimes are charged back to
the agencies for the prisoner’s upkeep.175
UNICOR is a product of the New Deal rather than the age of
neoliberalism, and its recent history is indicative of tensions between
these two paradigms of liberalism. In the 1980’s, fifty years after its
inception, UNICOR became controversial, subject to a spate of
Congressional legislative initiatives, hearings, and evaluation projects;
these continue today. The main debates involve competition with the
private sector, the enforcement of (and exceptions to) the mandatory
source rule, the level of wages of inmate workers, and overall
effectiveness as a prison program. The effectiveness questions appear
to have been settled by independent studies of recidivism and other
aspects of former inmates’ post-release experiences.176
An
independent study, mandated by Congress in 1991, confirmed minimal
displacement of civilian labor,177 but competition and mandatory
170. UNICOR, supra note, at 22 at 2.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Id.
173. JAMES, supra note 166, at Summary.
174. JAMES, supra note 166, at 1.
175. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136, at 34; PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 136, at 19.
176. UNICOR, supra note 22, at 26; see also JAMES, supra note 175, at 7.
177. See UNICOR, supra note 22, at 26 (referring to a mandated Congressional study
that found competition with the private sector to be “negligible”); see also JAMES, supra
note 175, at 1 (reporting study findings on recidivism as “inconclusive”).
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sourcing have remained contentious. In key respects, the debates
reflect wider policy debates (i.e., outside of the prison context) over
wages, social security, and free trade—with UNICOR’s reliance on
market protections coming under steady challenge, as its critics (from
the right and the left, for different reasons) pushed for more
competitive sourcing for government agencies, and for wage parity
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.178
Almost immediately after passage of the 1988 law that repositioned
UNICOR in relation to private sector markets, bills from both sides of
the aisle—most of which failed—were repeatedly introduced in
Congress in an effort to revise or repeal the mandatory sourcing
rule.179 Congressional hearings in 1997 were intended to resolve
tensions between UNICOR and its various critical camps by
recalibrating the linkage between mandatory sourcing and civilian
competition—in part by adjusting the sourcing rule, and in part by
promoting UNICOR’s production of goods and services that had
migrated offshore.180 The hearings made plain the wide range of
views—from a critique of prison industries as “‘quasi-slave’ labor,”181
to endorsements of PIE182 and PRIDE,183 to advocacy for specific

178. H.R. 2965, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), had it become law, would have given
prison workers 50% of the minimum wage in 2008, and 100% of the minimum wage in
2013, with a guarantee that not more than 80% of wages would be subject to
deductions. For a review of legislative initiatives that would have established
minimum wage protection for federal prison workers under FLSA, see generally
WILLIAM G. WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30697, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
MINIMUM WAGE IN THE 108TH CONGRESS TO AMEND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, (2005),
available
at,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=key
_workplace.
179. See, e.g., H.R. 2965, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); H.R. 1829, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2003); S. 766, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 2558, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999); H.R. 2965, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 1999); H.R. 2758, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997)
(reintroduced in 2006, 2011, and 2013); S. 200, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); S. 183,
102nd Cong. (1st Sess. 1991); S. 254, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989); H.R. 4994, 100th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); H.R. 4021, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); H.R. 3526, 100th Cong.
(2d Sess. 1988).
180. See Options to Improve and Expand Federal Prison Industries, supra note 160, at
8–11 (statement of Rep. McCollum, Chairman, Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime).
181. See id. at 14–16 (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
182. See id. at 34–36 (statement of Robert Sanders Division of Prison Industries, S.C.
Dep’t of Corrs.).
183. See id. at 24–33 (statement of Michael N. Harrell, Gen. Manager of New Bus.
Dev., Pride Enters.); id. at 42–49 (statement of Kenneth Mellem, President & CEO,
Geonex Corp.).

2014]

INMATE LABOR

397

proposals to eliminate the mandatory sourcing rule,184 among other
reforms of UNICOR. Subsequent hearings and revisions of the
mandatory source rule led to greater procurement flexibility on the
part of federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense and
the CIA.185
While the prison population continued to increase in the 2000’s,186
prison industries slumped in 2010 and suffered a loss of profitability
over at least the next three fiscal years187—reflecting the impact of the
global economic crisis on consumers (even large institutional
consumers such as government agencies), as well as prison industries’
new exposure to competition. The political rhetoric surrounding
federal prison industries shifted increasingly to a financialized model
at the same time that it reduced the market protections for prisonmade goods and services—and during the same period when prison
industries themselves shifted increasingly away from both the
discourse and practice of inmate rehabilitation.188 While a causal link
between these two broad developments (financialization and
punishment) is unlikely to be found, they may be seen as related
historically and functionally—given the simultaneous pressures on
correctional agencies to both discipline offenders and capitalize on
inmates’ potential to contribute to corrections revenue streams.189
C.
1.

Reforming Prisons Through Privatization: Two Models
Privatizing Inmate Labor: Chief Justice Burger’s Task Force Model

As noted in Part I, privatization was well-established as a principle
of government administration long before private prisons were on the

184. See id. at 50–56 (statement of Morgan O. Reynolds, Director, Crim. Justice Ctr.,
Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis).
185. See JAMES, supra note 175, at 2; O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 1.
186. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION
BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 3 (2014).
187. See id. at 3–4.
188. See Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics And The Carceral
State, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235, 252 (2008) (noting the absence of rehabilitation from
current discourses of incarceration); cf. Michelle Phelps, Rehabilitation In The Punitive
Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric And Reality In U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
33, 38 (finding that rehabilitative programming may be “more stable” than “widely
assumed”).
189. For example, beyond their direct contributions through wages for their own
upkeep, prisoners generate revenue when they occupy beds leased out by corrections
agencies or firms, by fees assessed for complaints deemed frivolous or found to be
without merit, by fees assessed for bad conduct, and by other means. See Aman,
Privatization and Democracy, supra note 12, at 274–75.

398

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

horizon. In the 1970s, the Department of Justice developed a package
of reforms of the prison labor system, envisioning a role for private
industry within prisons—as an innovation in rehabilitation, and an
improvement on the Federal Industries System.190 Chief Justice
Warren Burger was personally committed to prison labor reform along
these lines and is credited with having formulated the “factories with
fences” phrase that was widely associated with the concept.191 He was
instrumental in convening a meeting in 1984, co-sponsored by the
Johnson Foundation and the Brookings Institutions, that led to the
development of a National Task Force on Prison Industries in
February, 1985.192 The Task Force led in turn to an extensive
deliberation process involving representatives of the bench, the bar,
corrections professionals, academics, business and labor leaders, and
members of the Senate and House of Representatives; their meetings
resulted in a series of principles and recommendations that were
published in June, 1986.193 Their recommendations resulted in the
formation of the National Center for Innovations in Corrections, an
advisory group for states and localities interested in reform.
The overall purpose embraced by the Task Force was to transform
prison labor into a platform for reforming the entire prison system
around principles of rehabilitation and improvement of inmates’ postrelease prospects.194
The recommendations included an
organizational structure combining internal and external governance
structures for prison industries, with inmate participation in both
bodies.195 A strong role for organized labor alongside business was
also envisioned. Overall management of the prison would remain with
the corrections agency.
Meanwhile, Congressional hearings on prison industries reform,
including members of Congress and witnesses who were also
participating in the Task Force as members of the advisory board or as

190. See Barbara Auerbach, Federal Government Involvement In Private Sector
Partnerships Prison Industries, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 65,
at 91.
191. See FUNKE, supra note 19, at 17; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-98,
PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE 11 (1993), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217999.pdf.
192. See id. at 17–18.
193. See generally id.
194. See id. at 44.
195. See id. at 21.
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committee members, followed in 1985.196 The proposed reforms by
the Task Force sought an expansion of the private sector role
established for states by the Justice Systems Improvement Act of
1979,197 for all levels of the correction system. The recommendations
also included reforms aimed at developing parity of conditions for
inmate workers relative to the civilian workforce—setting limits to the
work day and work week, wages at the federal minimum wage,
affirming the right to organize, and other measures aimed at bringing
to an end the exploitation and abuses of the old contract labor and
leasing practices.198 As we have discussed above, Congress established
PIE and subjected UNICOR to the constraints of privatization, but it did
not include prison workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
2.

Privatizing Prison Financialization: President Reagan’s
Privatization Commission Model

Privatization drew the interest of President Reagan, as well, though
on different terms crafted primarily around economic competitiveness
as a driver of innovation and efficiency. The President’s Commission
on Privatization was created by Executive Order 12607 on September
2, 1987.199 The Commission Report’s discussion of prison privatization
opens with reference to prison crowding,200 but makes no mention of
the Congressional legislation that established mandatory minimum
sentences in 1984. The section on prison privatization consists of eight
recommendations supporting privatization as “effective and
appropriate” for federal, state, and local governments.201 The
Commission encourages experimentation and research involving
contracting at the Bureau of Prisons and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, including the federal demonstration project202
that a full ten years later—after much debate—yielded the Taft
Correctional Institution.203

196. See id. at 9–16, app. A (detailing the membership of the task force). See
generally Privatization Of Corrections: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985).
197. Justice Systems Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat 1167.
198. See generally MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 23.
199. Exec. Order No. 12607, 52 Fed. Reg. 34190 (Sept. 9, 1987).
200. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT 146–55 (1988), available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABB472.pdf.
201. Id. at 149–55.
202. See id. at 153.
203. The Bureau of Prisons followed up with a proposal for a demonstration project,
but the Senate Appropriations Committee rejected it. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent
Concerns, supra note 20, at 6.
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The President’s Commission report acknowledges criticisms of
prison privatization, particularly with respect to the idea of corrections
as a core governmental function appropriate for the public sector, as
well as issues of liability and accountability.204 They dealt with these
via assurances of experts. Regarding standards, the Commission relied
on the testimony of public and private corrections professionals,
among others, to affirm that the standards of the American Corrections
Association, as well as Constitutional and other legal requirements,
could hold private corrections to appropriate performance.205 Liability
could also be dealt with contractually. Regarding accountability, their
position was that “contract prison operations can add another layer of
accountability” to corrections.206
Overall, the section of the Commission report on prison
privatization was almost wholly given over to the financialization of
prison production, up to and including the ownership and operation of
an entire prison and its operations.207 This emphasis is consistent with
the priorities of the privatization movement, as discussed in previous
sections. We underscore this parallel as evidence of support for prison
privatization independent of—and earlier than—the prison crowding
crisis.
3.

The Task Force and the President’s Commission, Compared

The labor orientation of the Chief Justice’s Task Force was focused
primarily on internal reform of the corrections system, to eliminate
abuses and improve the post-release prospects for inmates. While the
Task Force did not ignore the potential for relief of tax burdens with
broader participation of the private sector, its principles and
recommendations were largely devoted to reorganizing institutional
structures, lines of communication and accountability, and systemwide relationships—all aimed at improving a person’s life after release
from prison. The Task Force dealt specifically with prison labor; its
path mapped a terrain of labor reform.208 As noted above, Congress
did not implement its full recommendations, particularly those most
204. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 201, at 150–51.
205. Id. at 150.
206. Id. at 147.
207. At the same time, the conservative Heritage Foundation promoted prison
privatization in similar terms, in a “backgrounder” dated May, 1988. Dana Joel, A Guide
to
Prison
Privatization,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(May
24,
1988)
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1988/05/bg650-a-guide-to-prisonprivatization.
208. See FUNKE, supra note 19, at 30–32; see also supra notes 69 and 160 and
accompanying text.
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immediately affecting the prisoner as worker—i.e., wages, hours, and
the right to organize. As also noted above, Congress adopted PIECP in
1979, introducing privately owned factories into prisons as envisioned
by the Task Force—a partial success.
The President’s Commission, on the other hand, was concerned with
privatization in general, very much along the lines of the privatization
movement as articulated by the Heritage Foundation and the Reason
Foundation, which continue to promote prison privatization in the
context of broader reforms of government.209 The Commission report
included prison privatization as one section among many. In general,
the Commission’s recommendations—in the prison context as well as
others—mapped a terrain involving a new financialization of
government, so as to better meet the challenges and opportunities of
global economic competition, as defined by the Commission’s
members.
The financialization model—essentially aimed at reducing fixed
costs (such as prisoner upkeep), maximizing economic efficiencies,
and, where possible, expanding revenue streams—has become familiar
to anyone who has been following public affairs in even the most
casual way, given the dominance of that model in public policy since
the late 1980s. But the labor reform model is likely less familiar, given
the extent to which minimum wage and collective bargaining remain
points of controversy and resistance within the Congress and in many
states.210 Thus, a comment like the following—the opening lines of the
Chief Justice’s Task Force report—presents terms of debate that might
be unfamiliar to readers whose experience of the privatization debate
has been entirely in terms of competitiveness and efficiency:
Public attention to prisons, the kinds of people in them, and the
activities that take place “behind the walls” is at an
unprecedented high level in our nation. Perhaps at no other
time in our history has such interest been manifested
simultaneously by citizens and public and private leaders at

209. Boerner, supra note 48, at 2–4 (RPPI is now the Reason Foundation); REASON
FOUND., supra note 46, at 21–23.
210. On current minimum wage debates, see Eric Morath et al., Wage-Rise Report
Sees Fewer Jobs, Less Poverty: Losses in Employment Partially Offset by Increased
Purchasing
Power,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
20,
2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230467550457939120135544250
2. On “right to work” controversies, see, for example, Sunday Dialogue: State Laws on
Unions,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-state-lawson-unions.html.

402

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

federal, state and local levels. Of highest interest is the work
inmates perform in prison, or prison industries.211
The differences between these approaches remain unresolved
within the federal government—debates over prison industries
continuing to contend over wages and competitiveness, and debates
over full privatization struggling over the monetization of
incarceration rates, among other things.
In conclusion to Part II, we have discussed two principal approaches
to privatization that developed within the federal government over the
course of the 1970s and 1980s. The more recent program, PIE,
emphasizes private enterprise production for consumption on the
open market. The older model, Federal Prison Industries/UNICOR,
emphasizes prison enterprise within a market guaranteed by a
mandatory sourcing rule as applied to government agencies. Both
models operate within public prisons, underscoring the extent to
which prison privatization does not automatically distinguish private
prisons from public ones, but links them through the prison labor
context. Prison labor has a far longer history than either of these
modern initiatives, but we have emphasized these because of the
insights they afford with respect to contemporary issues in prison
privatization, bridging public and private prisons, and in relation to the
broader significance of privatization in relation to the neoliberalization
of global capital.
CONCLUSION
Our purpose in the previous sections has been to contribute to a
reframing of the discussion of prison privatization by exploring its
American formation in the privatization movement, particularly in
relation to prison labor. Part I reviewed privatization in the form of
outsourcing as a mode of governance that is central to the
contemporary ways in which government now operates. In Part II, we
explored the roots of prison privatization in relation to the
privatization movement, as it was diversely taken up within the federal
government. We found that labor was the context in which
privatization—for better or for worse—was first and most enduringly
incorporated into the prison system. Adjusting the chronology of
modern prison privatization to correspond to the history of the
privatization movement makes visible the extent to which the
subsequent deepening of the prison crisis was—in terms of
resources—at least in part a consequence of the application of the
211. FUNKE, supra note 19, at 17 (paragraph break omitted).
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financialization model to prison management, governmental
budgeting, contracting, and monitoring. That policy choice was well
rehearsed (so to speak) in other areas of the government reshaped by
neoliberalization.212
Seen in light of this larger and more complex context, prison labor
is—to a degree that might be surprising—continuous with the civilian
labor force in its vulnerabilities to fluctuations in demand, pricing,
social supports, and various forms of rights.213 Indeed, some
proponents of prison industries have advocated for managing wages
and barring union activity so as to maintain competitive advantage
over the off-shore alternatives. Debates over UNICOR highlight
controversies over wages, collective bargaining, and free trade.214
Debates over PIE highlight the narrow conditions under which U.S.
labor is able to maintain a competitive advantage over offshore labor
in the global marketplace. Throughout this same period, minimum
wage, benefits, protections, and the right to organize were subjects of
debate with respect to the civilian labor force as well. To this extent,
we may look to prison labor to see what global competitive advantage
looks like from domestic ground.
From this standpoint, debates surrounding the privatization of
inmate labor are of a piece with debates over wages, benefits, and
collective bargaining outside of the prison context. We emphasize the
importance of this finding, as it suggests that the appropriate context
for analyzing prison privatization cannot be set wholly within prison
walls. In particular, the issues of competition with the private sector
and incentivizing firms to “insource”215 are reminders of the extent to

212. In the prison context, it is worth noting the apparent disconnect between this
policy choice and the legislation of 1984 and 1988 that resulted in the massive
increase in incarcerations and incarceration rates noted above. In that context, no
one—to our knowledge—claimed that private prisons could close the gap between the
supply and demand for prison capacity, only that the situation called for
experimentation. See Bowman et al., supra note 69, at 2 (“A bold solution is required,
and it may be in the hands of the private sector.”).
213. On conditions at the carceral margins of the civilian workforce in relation to the
precarity of social supports for the urban working poor, see generally Dora M. Dumont
et al., Public Health and the Epidemic of Incarceration, 33 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 325
(2012); Stephanie Kane & Theresa Mason, AIDS and Criminal Justice, 30 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 457 (2001).
214. An extended illustration of such debates may be found in witnesses’ testimony
before a House committee hearing on Federal Prison Industries. See generally Options
to Improve and Expand Federal Prison Industries, supra note 160.
215. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, President Obama
Issues Call to Action to Invest in America at White House “Insourcing American Jobs”
Forum (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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which inmate labor is—in these respects—a difference of degree, and
not of kind, with civilian labor. Wages, benefits, social security, and
other protections, as well as the right to organize, are issues in political
contention that affect the workforce at large. Moreover, prisons are
not the only context in which labor is highly constrained. The
maquiladoras of northern Mexico, the high-tech workshops of China,
and other locations where offshore workers’ labor for U.S. firms in
highly constrained living and working conditions, may be usefully
compared to the inmate labor situation.216 Military prisons are also
part of the FPI/UNICOR system, but beyond that specific connection,
military work—as work—also invites productive comparisons.217
This broader context suggests some limitations to approaching
prison privatization primarily as a contrast with public prisons,
beyond the fact that privatized labor spans both regimes. To be sure,
the conceptual distinction between public and private is of value
philosophically in relation to the different accountabilities of
government and business, to democracy, and to shareholders,
respectively. For this very reason, in more pragmatic terms, public and
private values or interests may not be on the same spectrum, since
government and private companies are held to different
accountabilities and rationales; they are also subject to different
formulations of success.
The debates over prison labor underscore the extent to which
“privatization” and “neoliberalism” are not monoliths, except perhaps
in their most ideologically framed terms. They are rubrics for diverse
models and approaches, and as such, they are open to different values,
expectations, and institutional norms.218 From this standpoint,
standard keywords from the privatization movement and its critics—
binaries such as public/private and law/market, and monoliths such as

office/2012/01/11/president-obama-issues-call-action-invest-america-white-houseinsourcing.
216. On maquiladoras, see KATHRYN KOPINAK, DESERT CAPITALISM: MAQUILADORAS IN
NORTH AMERICA’S WESTERN INDUSTRIAL CORRIDOR 7–20 (1996); see also Mary Beth Mills,
Gender and Inequality in the Global Labor Force, 32 ANN REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 41, 44–45,
53–54 (2003). On labor conditions at the social margins, see generally Sutti Ortiz,
Laboring in the Factories and the Fields, 31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 395 (2002). On the
global restructuring of labor, see Sarah Babb, The Social Consequences of Structural
Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Current Debates, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 202–14
(2005).
217. For an ethnographic study of a U.S. military base as an urban workplace, see
CATHERINE A. LUTZ, HOMEFRONT: A MILITARY CITY AND THE AMERICAN TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2002).
218. On accountability structures in privatization, see generally Laura Dickinson,
Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101 (2011).
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neoliberalism and globalization—do not do justice to the specifics
associated with particular sectors of governmental or entrepreneurial
activity, nor to the history by which financialization came to the fore as
the prevailing policy concern. Such binary approaches limit our
imaginations when it comes to reforming prisons, both public and
private. The roads not taken—or paths that may yet emerge—become
more visible once prison labor is taken into account. Viewed as a
workplace, corrections cannot be fully or automatically assimilated to
private enterprise, given that inmates are required to work, and do not
participate in setting the value of their own labor. That said,
constraints on the non-prison workforce in terms of choice in a
precarious labor market are not of a wholly different order.
Overall, refocusing discussion of prison privatization to include the
wider relevance of prison labor underscores the constraints of a
concept of privatization limited to financialization, and to prison
privatization solely in terms of efficiencies in prison construction and
management. In what appears to be the prevailing model for federal
and state prisoners, inmates are cost points to be mitigated by various
strategies for minimizing costs, including their own contributions to
revenue generation.
Financialization extends to contracts and
monitoring as well, as private firms may be held to a certain capacity—
or as firms in turn hold the contracting state agency to maintaining a
certain rate of capacity.219
Our analysis points to the vital importance of contracts and
monitoring as sites where prisoners’ wellbeing and post-release
prospects can be protected in the private prison context.220
The contracting process can be constructed in ways that enhance
such prospects, as well as the democratic process surrounding
corrections. In this regard, a first and crucial step would be to
acknowledge that private prisons involve a special form of
procurement that requires more than regulation of the bidding process
and conditions for payment. Prisoners—human beings with human
219. HACKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 62–64.
220. We refer to post-release prospects rather than rehabilitation to avoid the social
engineering implications analyzed by Mona Lynch in the parole context, in which she
finds that the term rehabilitation “indicates an aim to reform the parolee.” Mona Lynch,
Rehabilitation as Rhetoric: The Ideal of Reformation in Contemporary Parole Discourse
and Practices, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 40, 45 (2000). Some contracts, as well as other
privatization experiments such as “social impact bonds,” are now shifting the
performance requirements for capacity to the effectiveness of pre-release
programming, as measured by recidivism rates. The government contracts to repay
the firm if recidivism declines. Leonard Gilroy, Criminal Justice Reforms Prompt
Evolution in Private Sector Rehabilitation Offerings, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://reason.org/news/show/justice-reforms-privatization.
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needs—cannot reasonably be covered with the same sort of contract
and contract processes that are used, for example, to construct a bridge
or build a road.221 Non-marketized values are not easily expressed in
contract form, and private providers are therefore unlikely to face
checks—even with the most robust monitoring—if they are required
only to cut costs so as to maintain profitability and shareholder value.
Contracts for private prisons should be open to fully informed public
debate, especially when it comes to advocating for provisions that
might add additional protections and services for prisoners.222
To this end, the public needs to be more fully involved when it
comes to certain procedural and substantive contract provisions
involving prisons. Procedurally, the proposed contract itself should be
made public, perhaps on the contacting agency’s own website, not
unlike a proposed agency rule made available for comment. What
arrangements have been made for prison health care? Such provisions
should be made public before such decisions are made and members of
the public should have a chance to comment on them. More
substantively, the comments might also include advocacy for the
inclusion of certain provisions dealing with, for example, the
enhancement of the educational opportunities for the prisoners
involved, or specifically, what might be done to decrease the rates of
recidivism overall? What benchmarks and goals are written into these
contracts that require such efforts?
For the public to be effectively involved, information must be
gathered and made public concerning the track records of those
competing for these contracts, and information and monitoring must
occur throughout the duration of the contract once it is awarded. This
may involve innovative forms of monitoring and information sharing.
Contracts could, at a minimum, include liability rules that incentivize
the private firms to carry out their responsibilities in a constitutionally
appropriate way. While it may be difficult at present for courts to hold
private prison providers constitutionally liable for the negligent

221. For an analysis of these contracting processes and why they are not adequate
when human rights issues may be involved, see Aman, supra note 42, at 315–16.
222. There is a case to be made, for this reason, for private prisons to be run as nonprofit enterprises. One study comparing public, for profit, and non-profit juvenile
detention in terms of recidivism found that recidivism rates after non-profit detention
were significantly lower than public prisons and private for-profit prisons. Patrick
Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public
Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549 (2005). At the time of the study, no
adult prisons were managed on a non-profit basis. See David Pozen, The Private,
Nonprofit
Prison,
YALE
LAW
SCHOOL
(Mar.
1,
2006),
http://www.law.yale.edu/news/1691.htm.
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behavior of prison guards,223 such liability rules can be spelled out in
the contracts involved. By negotiating for contractual provisions that
extend liability for constitutional torts to the private corporations now
managing prisons, stronger incentive for private providers to minimize
the kinds of behavior that can adversely affect the health and wellbeing
of prisoners would result. Monitoring should also be public—including
attention to human rights and fair labor standards. To this end, the
contracts might also include clauses designating the prisoners
themselves as third party beneficiaries of these contracts, thereby
authorizing them to sue if they believe its provisions have been
breached.224 There should be no penalty against inmates who file legal
complaints, even if their claim is subsequently dismissed or not
granted.
While the political mainstreaming of privatization has involved
constant repetition of the mantra favoring markets over government
as reflecting values of competition and individual liberty over
constraints and state control, the relevance of privatization in the
prison context has been more obviously in relation to developments
elsewhere—trumping organized labor and sidestepping political
opposition to government expenditures for social security and various
forms of protection for workers in state legislatures and the Congress.
Inmate laborers in this sense share very directly in the condition of the
general labor force in their common sectors of industry, and improving
their status as beneficiaries of their own labor cannot be separated
from the parallel question on the other side of the prison walls. A focus
on their post-release integration highlights such parallels, as inmates
face re-incorporation into workplaces as well as their families and
communities. The restoration of voting rights for prisoners should
also be considered.225
223. See Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 786, 799 (7th Cir. 2014)
(affirming lower court grant of summary judgment, and holding that no constitutional
claim was stated. The majority noted, however, that “our prior cases hold, but without
explanation, that the Monell standard extends from local governments to private
corporations. As we explain . . . however, that conclusion is not self-evident.” (citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978))).
224. See Aman, supra note 42, at 323–25. See generally Alfred C. Aman Jr.,
Information, Privacy, and Technology: Citizens, Clients, or Consumers?, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR DAVID WILLIAMS 325 (Jack
Beatson & Yvonne M. Cripps eds., 2000).
225. The United States’ restriction of suffrage for prisoners and ex-prisoners
increased with the expansion of incarceration. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment:
An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 22–25 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). Such
restrictions yield a disparate effect on minorities: “There is clear evidence that state
felony disenfranchisement laws have a disparate impact on African-Americans and
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Our analysis also implies that discussion of approaches to regulating
prison privatization should not be focused solely on prisons per se, but
should also extend to privatization and outsourcing more generally,
and to the social security of underserved communities, including labor
security. This may mean developing a new approach to regulation—
one that is more open to due process and democratic participation—to
ensure maximum fairness for inmates, together with their
communities, whatever the entity may be that carries out the public’s
charge. Our goal in this analysis has been to suggest the extent to
which private prisons belong to a larger set of trends by which
collective forms of social responsibility—whether for prisoners or
others—has been increasingly placed by the government into the
hands of private firms along lines consistent with prevailing forms of
neoliberal capitalism. In the prison labor context, this has resulted in a
paradoxical situation in which the advantages claimed for privatization
cannot be achieved without legislative supports of various kinds—to
make work a requirement, suppress wages, and manipulate market
competition. Appreciating privatization in relation to globalization
draws attention to the wider significance of that paradox—and, we
hope, to the relevance of rethinking the limits of privatization for all of
us, from the prisoners’ side of the wall.

other minority groups . . . . In three states, at least one out of every five AfricanAmerican adults is disenfranchised: Florida (23%), Kentucky (22%), and Virginia
(20%).” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED: A REVIEW OF THE PREVALENCE AND
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_ICCPR%20Felony%20Disenfranchi
sement%20Shadow%20Report.pdf. See generally Katzenstein et al., supra note 24.

